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Abstract 
In this thesis we present a system for assisting with theorem proving of se-
curity protocols. The desirability of theorem proving is examined and a 
method of automating the encoding, and some sections of the proof, are 
demonstrated. We also discuss various aspects of two different classes of 
security properties: secrecy and agreement. We demonstrate how our sys-
tem can be used via two case study protocols, NetBill and SET. The proof 
can be decomposed into various sub-lemmas, most of which can be proven 
automatically, and then used to simplify the proofs of the final theorems of 
interest. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
The growth of the Internet has led to an increase in the desire for secure 
electronic transactions. The security of these transactions is generally not 
something that can be easily determined. If a flaw is discovered in an installed 
system, it is both hard and expensive to fix and also dangerous to the security 
of the overall system. Because of this it is better to attempt to ensure that 
the protocol is error free before it is installed. 
The difficulty in this lies in the complexity of the protocols, and also the 
subtlety of the errors. The Needham/Schroeder protocol [NS78] was long 
thought to be the easiest example of a public key cryptography handshake. 
However it was eventually shown to have a simple flaw which allowed a third 
party to intercept the communication and then capture and decode any data 
transfer between the two hosts. This flaw was found by Gavin Lowe [Low96] 
using the model checker FDR. His use of an automated system started a new 
interest in the use of formal methods for the assistance of verifying security 
protocols. Further discussion of this work can be found in Chapter 2. 
When developing a security protocol, there can be a large number of ex-
ploits relating to practical implementation limitations. These are often seen 
in the form of exploits such as buffer overruns, and are not able to be ad-
dressed in the system we will present here. The model we have developed 
is intended to be used in the context of the design of the protocols. Imple-
mentation issues, which are a separate field of research, are not discussed 
here. 
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1.1 Motivation 
Security protocols generally contain complex dependencies and can quickly 
become too large to be dealt with in a manual system. We believe that for-
mal methods are an excellent choice for modelling networking protocols, since 
they provide us with a rigorous framework, and security protocols are well de-
fined. Various techniques have attempted to meet the goal of understanding 
security protocols. These techniques will be reviewed in Chapter 2. As our 
literature review will show, there are two main techniques for formal verifica-
tion of security, namely model checking and theorem proving. Although both 
have been shown to be capable of analysing protocols successfully, neither 
are routinely used in an industry setting, mostly due to the high overhead 
involved. Theorem proving, in particular, is generally only found in limited 
contexts, since it is a non-automated system, requiring all actions to be pro-
vided by the operator. Model checking, in general, is found in some areas 
of industry, such as hardware development, but is still uncommon in proto-
col design. Another aspect which has caused problems with the widespread 
adoption of these formal systems is their difficult interaction with the user. 
Most formal systems require the protocol to be encoded in the language of 
the tool which will be used. This is normally a generic system, not specific 
to security protocols, and, as such, the protocol descriptions are often quite 
low-level, involving details of which the operator may not be aware. This 
limits them to the realm of experts. As such, we need a layer which allows 
users to design protocols in a standard language. We have addressed this 
problem by performing an automated translation from protocol description 
to formal model. 
1.1.1 Model Checking vs. Theorem Proving 
Model checking is the technique for applying some kind of temporal formula 
to a model of a system. This is a fully automated process. If the system 
satisfies the formula, then the model checker simply outputs a result in the 
affirmative, and that is all of the information the user is given. If the system 
does not satisfy the formula for some reason, then a run of the system in 
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which the formula is invalid is generated. This run can then be used as the 
basis for corrections to either the model or the formula. Model checking 
works essentially by a complete enumeration of the state space in which a 
given problem is placed. This enumeration thus requires that this space is 
finite, otherwise complete enumeration would be impossible. Model checking 
also requires a decision procedure for the system. Thus it asserts restrictions 
on the logics that can be used, as they must be decidable. Many logics, 
including first order logic, are not decidable. 
Theorem proving is a manual system, and is not automated at all in its 
most fundamental definition. In general, theorem proving is a framework 
under which proofs can be carried out, with the tool simply maintaining the 
state information, and ensuring that the proof does not violate any of its 
rules. It assists with theorem proving, rather than performing the actual 
proof itself. Since the proof is actually directed by the user, the full struc-
ture for this is available for viewing. Thus if a proof fails to be completed, 
the user may be able to gain insight through this structure. However, since 
theorem provers do not normally disprove theorems, a failure for a proof to 
be complete can either be caused by an invalid theorem, or simply by the 
user being uncertain as to how to complete the proof. It is only when a proof 
is completed that the user can be certain about the results. Because of the 
manual nature of theorem proving, we no longer have the same decidability 
problems as with model checking; the user must now be able to make the de-
cisions on behalf of the system. Although theorem proving is non-automated, 
these systems generally have some kind of scripting ability built into them. 
These are known as strategies. 
We have used a theorem proving tool, PVS [COR+95], rather than model 
checking for several reasons. The finite nature of model checking requires 
that any given protocol definition be confined to a limited number of runs. 
Generally with the protocol tools that are written using model checkers, 
the implementation chooses this number to be one. This one run is usually 
sufficient to provide information about most of the exploits, as few require 
information to be carried from round to round. Thus most model checking 
systems allow only single round attacks to be analysed. However, this single 
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round limitation can cause problems when dealing with complex protocols. 
With a theorem prover, we are no longer bound to a finite state space; 
we can define any kind of arbitrary state information that we wish. The 
trade-off is that we no longer have the ability to automatically prove our 
constraints; we must instead manually guide the proof. This manual guiding 
is the aspect of protocol verification that we wish to reduce. Initially, before 
a support system was well established, we estimated the time taken during 
the proof of a single secrecy theorem of SET to take approximately eighteen 
hours of human interaction, with approximately four hours of computation 
time. PVS keeps track of both interaction and CPU time elapsed, but our 
interaction time includes periods in which the tool was running, but not 
in use. Our numbers have been adjusted to take this into account. Most 
of this time is spent redoing the same class of proof repeatedly, as well as 
recovering from failed proof attempts. A massive amount of mental effort 
was required to understand the proof, with subsequent difficulties. Due to 
its vast size, the operator was unable to consider the proof in its entirety, and 
was instead forced to consider only the current subtree. Due to the highly 
repetitive nature of the proofs, it was often the case that the technique used 
to prove one branch would have been forgotten by the time a similar branch 
was uncovered. This would result in a full analysis being repeated, when the 
results were already available, but difficult to locate. 
1.2 Goals 
We intend to demonstrate the technique we have developed to take a realistic 
protocol description, translate it into a formal description in PVS, and then 
assist the proof. This is done through the use of both auto-generated lemmas, 
and hand-coded strategies which work with these lemmas. Our encoding 
system is discussed, and which lemmas we have chosen to reduce the proof 
effort. We hope that our system will reduce the amount of effort involved 
to a level which demonstrates the practicality of using formal methods with 
respect to protocol design. 
Our tool is designed for the semi-expert user, since we believe full-automa~ion 
I 
is not realistically possible. There will still be interaction with the theoreni 
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proving PVS environment. This interaction is generally simply the instanti-
ation of the appropriate strategy, and as such should not require much more 
than a list of corresponding strategies to the lemmas on which they work. 
However, where we have not fully developed strategies, the user in control of 
PVS, hereafter known as the operator, must directly invoke whatever PVS 
commands are appropriate. This will require a reasonable knowledge of PVS, 
and at least some knowledge of the protocol involved. The aim is to minimise 
this as far as possible. 
Two papers have been published on two large sections of the work in this 
thesis. One describing the lemmas and strategies we have used, and how we 
have developed their auto-generation, is to be published in the New Zealand 
Journal of Computing 2001 [RK01b]; the other, which covers the environment 
we have developed, and how the operator interacts with it, is to be presented 
at the Australian Software Engineering Conference 2001 [RK01a]. 
1.3 Summary of this Document 
Chapter 2 outlines the ground work undertaken in this area, and introduces 
the necessary technical background of the tools we will employ. In particular, 
we will discuss how the PVS theorem prover has been used, and how the 
operator interacts with the environment we have created. 
The creation of the translation tool, and the techniques it uses to produce 
the desired output are described in Chapter 3. We discuss some alternative 
methods that could have been used, and why we felt our final decisions pro-
duced a superior outcome. We will also discuss the generation of assisting 
lemmas and how we decide which of these should be generated. The appli-
cation of these lemmas allows us to recognise patterns, which we, in turn, 
develop into strategies to speed up the interaction with the theorem prover. 
We will investigate how these strategies are applied, and the completeness of 
this automation in the various areas of the protocol analysis. This chapter 
defines the bulk of the original research involved in the creation of the tool. 
In Chapter 4 we apply the tool to two different protocols, SET and Net-
Bill, and use the lemmas and strategies generated to prove properties in these 
case studies. We will show which aspects of our proof tool, and of our proofs, 
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can be generalised, and which must remain protocol specific. We will also 
perform a brief effort analysis comparison between our new system and the 
original hand-coded system. This chapter presents the analyses of our ideas, 
and the testing of the concepts of this thesis. 
Our work is reviewed in Chapter 5, providing a summary of the key 
aspects. In particular we will focus on how successful our techniques have 
been with respect to the case studies from Chapter 4, as well as how well we 
anticipate these results generalising to other protocols, and why we believe 
this is so. We will also summarise the key lemmas and strategies which 
provided the greatest improvement in proof time and effort. Finally some 
aspects of the system that are not yet completed, as well as some other 
aspects which we have not yet fully studied, but appear to hold some interest, 
will be discussed. 
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Chapter II 
Preliminaries 
2.1 Protocol Verification 
The earliest work on formal specification of protocols [BAN89] develops a 
logic for discussing protocols, and defining properties which should hold. 
This work does not discuss any form of implementation issues; it is a formal 
description of the framework required for reasoned discussion about these 
protocols. This work has been referred to by most of the other work discussed 
in this chapter, and although we have not used the logic directly, some of the 
concepts that it defines have been adapted into some of the works which we 
have used. 
2.1.1 Model Checking 
One of the earliest formal protocol analyses [Low95] was performed on 
the Needham-Schroeder protocol [NS78]. This work demonstrated how the 
Needham-Schroeder protocol could be broken using a man-in-the-middle at-
tack. This work was of interest because the protocol had long been used as 
the example of how to use public/private key handshaking to set up a shared 
common key, and its simplicity, three messages, meant it was always believed 
to be secure. A simple protocol, assumed to be correct for seventeen years, 
having a flaw, emphasises the need for further analysis of other protocols. 
This prompted the initial work on formal methods in security protocols. 
A system designed primarily to deal with the model checking of security 
protocols has also been developed [MCJ97], and contains many of the same 
ideas we use, for example the concept of closure described in this work is 
very similar to our concept of knowledge, discussed in Section 3.4.1. This 
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work also discusses a method of simplifying protocol descriptions. Rather 
than forcing the user to discuss protocols directly in the language of the 
model checker, CSP in this case, there is a simplified notation based on the 
commands send, receive, and newnonce. This language is not discussed in 
depth, but the ability to perform this translation automatically, as we have, 
is mentioned. Casper is another protocol model checking system, which is 
further discussed in Section 2.1.3. 
SET has also been analysed in [MS98], and one of the authors has built an 
interesting tool to automate some of the procedures, [Mea96]. This tool, the 
NRL Protocol Analyser, (named after the Navy Research Laboratory), is not 
publicly available. Thus, we have not been able to review it in any realistic 
way. An overview of the literature of this tool shows that it is a Prolog based 
system, and similar in ma:ny ways to the model checking systems discussed 
in [MCJ97]. For this reason we believe it will still suffer from the same 
problems as other model checking systems, as described in Chapter 1. It also 
requires the operator to encode the protocol directly in the proof system, 
thus requiring extra effort on the operator's behalf. 
2.1.2 Theorem Proving 
One of the pioneering works on theorem proving of security protocols [Pau99] 
involved the verification of TLS. In this work the inductive technique is used 
to assist in the analysis. This technique is quite simple: the proof is split into 
two halves. The first half states that a base case is safe. This is generally 
trivially proven, as the base case is often an empty run. The second half states 
that, given a valid run of the protocol in which our security property holds, 
no valid extension of this run will break our security property. This is very 
similar to the standard mathematical induction system. It is also noted that 
they required over two hundred lemmas for completion of the final results. In 
this work, the theorem prover Isabelle [PauOl] was used. This tool requires a 
much deeper embedding than PVS, and would thus require a greater number 
of sub-lemmas. Portions of SET have also been analysed using a similar 
technique [BMPTOO]. This analysis, while on a different portion of SET 
to our system, has allowed us to gain a greater understanding of the SET 
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protocol, as well as highlighting some additional features for analysis which 
we would otherwise not have discovered. 
A PVS encoding for describing a necessarily parallel attack was described 
m [Mil99]. In this work the fictitious FFGG protocol is analysed, which 
requires an arbitrary number of parallel spies to discover the flaw. Another 
paper on protocol independent secrecy [MROO], also developed by the same 
group, expands on the concepts of the parallel attack system. This work also 
discusses the details of the logic behind their PVS implementation in greater 
depth. This work was fundamental to our own encoding. 
The field of theorem proving and security protocols is quite recent, com-
pared to that of model checking. Its non-automated nature has prevented 
its widespread use. 
2.1.3 CAPSL and Casper 
CAPSL [DM99], the Common Authentication Protocol Specification Lan-
guage, is a protocol description language developed at SRI, under a DARPA 
funded project. A tool called Casper [Low98] was developed to automate 
analysis using a model checking system. It converts from a protocol descrip-
tion to the process algebra CSP [Hoa85], which can then be checked in the 
model checker FDR [Ros94]. Casper contains many similarities to CAPSL, 
especially in the message description language. Most of these similarities 
stem from the common standard which most protocol designers use. Casper, 
however, has one difference; it is also a proof tool assistant. It attempts 
to prove the properties which it is given, whereas CAPSL is a system for 
specifying these, but does not fully describe a system under which they can 
be proven. CAPSL does specify an intermediary language, called CIL (the 
CAPSL Intermediate Language), and a method for translating into this lan-
guage, but it is not a proof environment, and lacks support for actually per-
forming any analysis. A comparison of the two systems is given in [Low98]. 
Casper uses a scenario based system, in which the details of the analysis are 
guided by a scenario specification. This specification can contain constraints 
on attributes such as the number of runs, or hosts involved. The results of 
the analysis are thus only valid to the scenario specified. 
9 
2.2 PVS 
2. 2.1 Details 
PVS [COR+95] is a theorem proving tool developed by SRI. It is a generalised 
tool, providing an interactive environment suitable for mathematical and 
theoretical modelling. An example of the input to PVS is shown in Figure 2.1. 
This is a simple theory of the factorials of natural numbers. We initially 
define a predicate, factorial, which is quite simple: if X is greater than 0, 
then factorial(X) is X x factorial(X- 1), otherwise it is 1. We also define 
several theorems, building progressively in interest until our final theorem, 
factorial_greater_or_equal, which states that the factorial of a number 
is always greater than or equal to the number itself. The proof tree for 
this simple theorem is shown in Figure 2.3. This is the standard PVS tree 
diagram used in this thesis when we discuss proofs. The commands entered 
to perform the proof are the same as those shown in the nodes of the proof 
tree. The proof tree is useful as it shows the structure of how the proof is 
conducted. In this example, the first branch indicates the induction over X. 
Thus the left hand side denotes the case where X = 0, while the right hand 
side denotes the inductive step. 
In the recursive definition of factorial, PVS requires us to define what is 
known as a measure function, X in our case. These measure functions are 
used to define a bounding on the recursion, that is, as the measure function 
decreases, the recursion must near completion. 
When proving theorems in PVS, we are shown the current state of the 
proof in what is known as a sequent. The sequent is broken into two parts 
by a horizontal line. The formulae above the line are known as the an-
tecedents, and those below are called the consequents. The interpretation 
is that "the conjunction of the antecedents implies the disjunction of the 
consequents" [COR+95]. There can be any, including zero, number of terms 
in either of these two parts. An example of these is shown in Figure 2.2. 
This is how the formula is displayed in the PVS environment. The formula 
is read as: factorial(j') ~ j' :::} factorial(j' + 1) ~ j' + 1 
However on occasion we will require greater details of the exact nature of 
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sample: THEORY 
BEGIN 
W, X, Y, Z: VAR nat 
factorial(X): RECURSIVE nat = IF (X > 0) THEN 
X X factorial(X- 1) ELSE 1 ENDIF 
MEASURE (X) 
greater _equalJmplies_greater _equal: THEOREM 
VW, X, Y, Z: W2::XI\Y2::Z=?W+Y2::X+Z 
factorial _greater _zero: THEOREM 't:f. X : factorial (X) 2:: 1 
multiply _positive: THEOREM 't:/ X, Y: X > 1 1\ Y > 1 =? X X Y > 1 
multiply _by _Lgreater: THEOREM 
V X, Y: X 2:: 1 1\ Y 2:: 1 =? X x Y 2:: Y 
factorial_greater_or_equal: THEOREM V X: factorial (X) > X 
END sample 
Figure 2.1: Sample PVS Theory 
factorial_greater_or_equal: 
{-1} factorial(j') 2:: j' 
{1} factorial(j' + 1) 2:: j' + 1 
Figure 2.2: Sample Sequent from PVS 
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the PVS encoding. In these cases we will use a small example of PVS code. 
~ (induct 'X") 
~ 
(rewrite .lactorial") 
I 
~ (assert) 
I 
~ (rewrite •factorial" 1) 
I 
~ (assert) 
~ (lJ ... ) 
~ 
(inL?l 
I 
~ (assert) 
~ ~ ~ (assert) (assert) 
I I 
(le=a •factoril_greater_,ero') (1-A •multipJ_by_l_greater') 
I ~ (inst?) 
I 
~ (inst -1 • factorial (jIll' "j Jl•) 
I 
~ (assert) 
Figure 2.3: Sample PVS Proof Tree 
The commands used are as follows: 
induct This is used when we wish to use an inductive technique in our 
proof, with a statement of the form: V X : p(X). We then generate 
two sub-lemmas, (X= 0) =} p(X), and p(X) =} p(X + 1). This is the 
standard mathematical use of induction, and works automatically on 
various types, including lists, integer numbers, etc ... 
12 
rewrite We use rewrite when we wish to replace one of our predicate names 
with the actual definition of the predicate. Thus, if we have an expres-
sion of the form (X= 0) ::::} p(X), which is unprovable without knowing 
the details of p, we would use rewrite to reveal these details. It simply 
expands the body of the definition of the function, p in this case, into 
where that function is used. 
assert This is shorthand for a combination of various other PVS commands. 
However for our purposes we normally use it for boolean simplification. 
It applies standard decision procedures. For example, if we had the 
expression: (X ::::} Y) 1\ X and we wished to prove Y, assert could 
solve this for us. 
skosimp This is shorthand for skolerilize and simplify. The simplifications 
are a simple flattening (see below) of conjunctive expressions in the 
antecedent. 
lemma Here we instantiate some previously defined lemma. PVS does not 
force lemmas to be proven before they are used, but it does prevent for-
ward referencing of lemmas, which prevents circular proofs from being 
constructed. The normal method is to write the lemmas starting with 
the simplest, and move down in order of difficulty. Proofs can then be 
performed top down in the file. This is the method we have used for 
our encoding. 
inst We use inst to give values to expressions such as V (in the antecedent), 
and 3 (in the consequent). There is an alternative version of this com-
mand, inst? which attempts to automatically guess the appropriate 
instantiations. This is useful in small scenarios where there are few 
candidates, but in larger proofs, where there are a large number of 
possible answers, PVS does not often guess correctly. There is also a 
version of inst? which can attempt to perform a full evaluation in 
which it will produce multiple possible instantiations. It is written in 
PVS as inst? :if-match all. This is useful for finalising proofs, where 
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there are few arguments, but it can rapidly increase to a large number 
of cases. For example if the expression: :JA, B : p(A) => p(B) required 
instantiating, and there were four candidate values for both A and B, 
we would now have sixteen instantiated expressions. 
split This will split the proof into two subproofs based on either an V (in 
the antecedent), or an 1\ (in the consequent). 
Other commands used in this thesis, but not shown in our example are: 
flatten This simply converts expressions of the form A 1\ B (in the an-
tecedent), and expressions of the form A VB (in the consequent) into 
two separate expressions. 
then This allows us to joih several commands together into one. This is used 
when calling PVS functions which expect to take only one argument, 
such as the strategy declaration, defstep. 
repeat This will continue to execute its argument, another PVS method, 
until it has no effect on the current sequent. There is an alternative 
version called repeat*, which will run itself recursively on any child 
nodes that are generated, i.e.: when split is called. 
2.2.2 Strategies 
PVS strategies are simply collections of PVS commands, which are then given 
a name. Using our factorial example, we could remove the body of the final 
right hand branch by using a strategy such as that shown in Figure 2.4. 
In this example we can see that the four commands which make 
up the final branch could now be replaced with a single command, 
(factoriaLstrategy). The final two arguments of the defstep command 
are strings which describe its functionality. The first will be shown in the 
tree generated; the second will be shown if verbose options are enabled. Nor-
mally we would like our strategies to be as general as possible, so lines such as 
(inst -1 "factorial(j! 1) 11 "j! 1") are undesirable, as they contain too 
much specific information, the consequent number, -1, and the exact variable 
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(defstep factorial_strategy () 
(then 
(assert) 
(lemma 11 multiply_by_1_greater 11 ) 
(inst -1 11 factorial(j!1) 11 11 j!1 11 ) 
(assert)) 
11 factorial_strategy 11 11 removes the final branch of the facorial proof 11 ) 
Figure 2.4: Sample PVS Strategy 
names, j ! 1. We can often avoid these by passing any specific values in as 
arguments, or in the case of inst we can often use the alternatives inst? or 
inst? :if-match all. 
2.2.3 Inline Notation 
In this thesis we use, where convenient, the standard mathematical theorem 
notation, rather than the exact PVS code, to represent our axioms, lemmas, 
and theorems. This is simply for readability, since PVS is a normal text 
based system so it has little symbolic notation; most mathematical terms 
are spelled out in full text. Thus our example code is not directly loadable 
into PVS, although it does represent the same concepts. We also distinguish 
between predicates and theorems through the following scheme: predicates 
take some arguments, and are thus represented as: 
greaterThan(A, B) :A> B 
whereas lemmas are simply statements of truth, and will be represented as: 
"5 is greater than 3" Lemma: 5 > 3 
2.3 Bringing it all together 
While we have not taken all of the semantics relating to multiple spies used 
in [Mil99], we have used the initial encoding as the basis for our initial model. 
Even though it has since evolved in quite a different direction, the encoding 
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style used in this work is definitely still visible in our system. 
We have used sections of the work in [MCJ97] for the development of our 
input language. However, the discussion of the input language in that paper 
is quite slim, as the work emphasises the logic used to specify the protocol 
properties. We have not used a full formal logic for our security properties, 
as we desire our input description to be as simple for the protocol designer 
to read as possible. 
We have modelled our input language heavily on the basic syntax of 
CAPSL. We have simplified some of the syntax slightly, such as encryption 
where we do not require the explicit naming of the encryption form, e.g. 
public/private and shared, as this can be determined from the key involved. 
We have also extended the input language slightly, adding some process al-
gebraic semantics to allow for more dynamic protocols to be described. We 
have used the CCS [Mil90] process style as the basis for these extensions. A 
complete definition of our language is discussed later in Chapter 3. CAPSL 
contains considerable information outside the message flow description. This 
information has not been used in our model. This is mostly due to the 
specifics of our implementation, and the limits that we have imposed. We 
have instead modified these sections to focus on the data in which we are in-
terested. For example, computational rules have been omitted, and security 
properties have been simplified, so that the effort by the operator is minimal. 
Our input syntax also shares many features with Casper, particularly with 
the security property specification, of both Secret and Agreement which we 
have mirrored directly. 
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Chapter III 
Translator 
The first aspect of the research involved in this project is the construction 
of a translation tool. The input language we accept and the techniques used 
to simplify the user interaction with the theorem prover are the primary 
contributions we have made towards the goal of easing protocol proofs. In 
this chapter we will discuss the output from the tool, and how the various 
ideas are combined in the final result to produce a simple, fast and usable 
system. 
In an effort to remedy the problems relating to the manual nature of the-
orem proving, we have developed a system for breaking down the proofs into 
manageable chunks and a selection of strategies for automatically proving 
some of these chunks. This has reduced the time taken for a secrecy proof 
to approximately one hour of interaction, with only about fifteen minutes of 
computation time. We have also introduced another benefit: since the proofs 
are broken down, we can now reuse various aspects of these within all proofs, 
and thus subsequent proofs take much less time, since we do not need to 
reprove anything we have already done. 
3.1 General Ideas 
The translator is designed to transform the input protocol definition into a 
suitable PVS encoding and any auxiliary subsystems we might require to 
usefully manipulate this encoding. It uses a Bison [DS95] based parser to 
convert the input into a parse tree, and then convert this parse tree into 
the required subsystem. There are two main sections of the parser, as with 
most parsers: parse tree construction and parse tree inspection. We will 
not discuss the construction of the parse tree, and simply state that it is 
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constructed by using the standard LALR [ASU86] parsing technique. 
The focus of this translation tool is to simplify the effort of manually 
transforming the protocol specification into a formal model, and to assist 
in the manipulation and proving of properties of this formal model. The 
development process for this tool has been incremental, with a hand-coded 
model being gradually constructed to meet the desired requirements. This 
hand-coded system is then gradually generalised into the auto.,.generation 
tool. The input to our translation tool is similar to that of CAPSL and 
Casper, as discussed in Chapter 2. Most of the basic message concepts remain 
the same; we have only modified the auxiliary structure, as well as making 
small changes to the methods for describing the overall message flow. 
The primary goal has been to simplify verification of the proof. To this 
end we have developed a series of additional supporting features to assist the 
user. We hope to provide near automation, since, with a theorem proving 
environment, full automation is impossible in the general case. The simple 
aspects of the proofs have been automated, and strategies and supporting 
lemmas have been provided to divide the large and complex sections into 
manageable components. 
The two security aspects which we have chosen for our analysis are se-
crecy and agreement. Secrecy denotes the idea of a given token being secure, 
and unable to be learned by a spying third party. Secrecy is a global invari-
ant, similar to safety properties in standard formal methods, and thus has an 
easily defined specification. Its ease of specification, and strict rules, makes 
it easier to automate under our system. Agreement is the idea that a spe-
cific token is eventually known to two or more hosts. Agreement is thus an 
eventuality, or a liveness property. This makes the specification of agreement 
more involved than that for secrecy, since we cannot globally qualify it, as 
it is only true in some states of the system. As with liveness properties in 
general, it is hard to prove. 
3.2 Translation Tool Syntax 
We have adapted ideas from all the systems discussed in Chapter 2 to cre-
ate our own protocol specification system. We have taken the base syntax 
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from CAPSL and Casper, but included some of the CCS syntax, and ideas 
on representation and structure from both Message Sequence Charts and 
Graphs. 
Protocol 
Specification 
Protocol 
f------""1 Encoding 
PVS 
Encoding 
Figure 3.1: Thanslator Process Pipeline 
The translation tool we have developed follows a simple basic model, as 
shown in Figure 3.1. We take the protocol specification from the user, and 
extract two subsystems: the protocol encoding and the security property 
theorems. We then use our protocol independent lemmas along with these 
two to form our overall PVS encoding. Finally, together with the strategies 
we have developed, we can output the final proofs. We have attempted to 
automate each step in this pipeline, although some are far more difficult 
than others. This section will now discuss the format of the input language 
we accept, with Section 3.2 describing the semantics associated with this 
language. 
We have based the core protocol definition portion of our language on 
the CAPSL and Casper languages, with some additional concepts from other 
systems, as discussed in Section 2.3. H~wever, our auxiliary definitions have 
been designed separately to include features in which we were interested. 
This difference is not particularly important, since the protocol description 
is the key issue. The auxiliary information simply provides hints to the 
translator. Thus, the protocol description is split into two logical sections: 
the prologue and the protocol definition. The prologue contains descriptions 
19 
of the variables involved, the properties we wish to hold true, the initial 
knowledge of the hosts (including the Spy), and what capabilities we want the 
Spy to have. Following the prologue is the protocol and message definition, 
where we have followed the CAPSL/Casper syntax. This consists of two 
types of messages: either those which describe the structure of the protocol, 
or those that describe a literal communication between two hosts. These two 
message types are described in Section 3.3.1. 
A BNF grammar for the language we have designed is defined in Fig-
ure 3.2. 
The process element of the state is defined using a similar syntax to those 
found in [Mil90]. The three operators we have taken from this system can 
be combined using the following simple grammar: 
Protocol -+ X 
Protocol I Protocol 
Protocol + Protocol 
Protocol ; Protocol 
This defines the following operators, which we have also used in our de-
scription: 
• I : Parallelism, two processes run in parallel. There is no fairness re-
striction here. We denote this with the term parallel in our encoding. 
• + : Choice, the arbitrary decision between two possible processes. De-
noted by choice in our encoding. 
• ; : Sequencing, simple concatenation of one process after another. 
Denoted by sequence in our encoding. See Figure 3.6. 
• X·: An atomic action. In our encoding this corresponds to a message 
sent from one host to another. These become the basic communications 
of our protocol. 
20 
Full Protocol 
--+ Protocol <String> 
<Constants> 
<Variables> 
<Initials> 
<Spy> 
<Specifications> 
<Protocol> 
Constants 
--+ Constant <Declaration> { , <Declaration> } 
Variables 
--+ Variables <Declaration> { , <Declaration> } 
Initials 
--+ Initial <Knowledge> { , <Knowledge> } 
Knowledge 
--+ knows ( <Host> ) = <Variable> { , <Variable> } 
Spy 
--+ Spy <SpyType> { , <SpyType> } 
SpyType 
--+ Observation 
--+ Synthesis 
--+ Destruction 
Specifications 
--+ Spec <SpecType> { , <SpecType> } 
Spec Type 
--+ Agreement ( <Host> , <Host> , '[' <Variable> { , <Variable> } ']' ) 
--+ Secret ( <Host> , '[' <Variable> { , <Variable> } ']' ) 
Declaration 
--+ <Variable> { , <Variable> } : <VariableType> 
VariableType 
--+ Host 
--+ Nonce 
--+ Key 
--+ Signature 
--+ Natural 
--+ Hash 
--+ Certificate 
Protocol 
--+ <Message> { , <Message> } 
Message 
--+ <Variable> = <Host> -> <Host> : <Field> { , <Field> } 
--+ <Variable> = <Variable> { ; <Variable> } 
--+ <Variable> = <Variable> { I <Variable> } 
--+ <Variable> = <Variable> { + <Variable> } 
Field 
--+ <Variable> 
--+ '{' <Field> { , <Field> } '}' <Variable> 
--+ <Variable> '{' <Field> { , <Field> } '}' 
Figure 3.2: Input Language Grammar 
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Figure 3.3: Internal Process Tree Representation 
This encoding breaks our protocol down into a fairly simple graph struc-
ture, where links denote parentage. Thus we could say that there is a link 
from node Protocol to node Message_!, see Figure 3.3. For most protocols 
we can be even stricter than this as most adhere to a tree structure, where 
the leaf nodes indicate the communication messages, and all those above in-
dicate process messages. The root of the tree is now the controlling process, 
and all leaf nodes are now communication messages. 
The atomic action, X, in our above grammar, is now a message sent from 
one host to another. It is defined in the following form: 
Host1 ---+ Host2 : Payload 
3. 2.1 Message Field Types 
As can be seen in our context free grammar, Figure 3.2, there are seven 
different field types which can appear within messages. There is also one 
implicit field type, encryption, which we will also discuss here. Each of these 
types is considered distinct, as will be discussed below. 
Host This describes an agent of the system. It can be used to identify target 
agents, or as the basis for key negotiation. 
Nonce A nonce is a special random number in cryptography, which cannot 
be guessed. Under the assumption of perfect cryptography, we have 
assumed that no two nonces are ever the same. 
Key This is the key to some encryption. We have not made a distinction 
between public/private and shared keys in the type rules, as we do 
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this through predicates relating key inverses. That is, for shared keys, 
the inverse is known if given the original. However this is not true for 
public/private keys. 
Signature This is a cryptographic signature used to verify the authenticity 
of a field. 
Certificate Certificates are often used to verify the identity of a host when 
given a trusted third party. For example in the SET protocol, hosts use 
a third party certificate authority from which to lodge and retrieve cer-
tificates, allowing individual hosts to directly communicate, but adding 
the ability to ensure only trusted communication. 
Natural We have added the natural type as a general place holder for other 
data that does not directly contribute to the cryptographic properties 
of the protocol. Thus it is often used to denote some piece of data 
which is transferred. For example, if the object of a protocol is to 
transfer a user's name as a string of characters encrypted with some 
key, we could not simply drop the name from the protocol, as that 
would remove meaning, but since we also are not interested in the 
actual contents of it, we would thus use the Natural type to hold this 
data. 
Hash A hash under our system is assumed to be perfect. That is, no two 
items ever collide, and given a hash it is impossible to guess the fields 
from which it was constructed. These are known as non-invertible, or 
one-way, hashes. We do not make a distinction between the different 
types of hashing; all systems, such as SHA [Bur95], are assumed to be 
of equivalent strength. Also, due to our higher level of abstraction we 
do not deal with issues such as hash lengths. 
Encryption This is not a strict type, as the other seven here are, as a 
variable cannot be declared of this type. However, it is used implicitly 
whenever a key is applied to a field. We use this type in the internal 
representation of our protocols. We have assumed perfect encryption, 
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that is, a field can never be guessed given its encrypted text, and no 
key can be guessed given an example of both the plain and cyphertext. 
Each message is then represented as a list of these variables of these 
various types. When declaring these there is an implicit assumption that 
they are all unique. For example, if given the following definition: 
X, Y Key 
A, B Natural 
we assume that X =!= Y, A =!= B. We also assume all types to be distinct, 
i.e.: A =/= X. There are alternatives to this approach, which allow for these 
items to be possibly equal, but this vastly increases the effort involved in 
the proofs, and does not offer much benefit for security properties, especially 
when considering only perfect cryptography. 
To demonstrate the various parts of our protocol design, given the pro-
tocol defined in Figure 3.4, the state transition system would be similar to 
that shown in Figure 3.5. The final state, blank is further discussed in Sec-
tion 3.3.2. 
Protocol 
Message1 
Message2 
Message1;Message2 
A---+ B: A, {X}K1 
B---+ A: B, {X}K2 
Figure 3.4: Simple Two Message Protocol 
Message1 Message2 r---~ 
I Message1 ; Message2 1 ) I Message2 1 ) I blank I 
Figure 3.5: Two Message State Transition System 
24 
3.3 Translation System Semantics 
3. 3.1 State Transition System 
The overall design of the encoding is as a state transition system. Each state 
in our transition system is internally represented as a pair, a combination of 
a process, and a history of previously seen messages. 
From this definition, our translator builds the state transition system, 
as well as a variety of predicates to manipulate it. These predicates are 
mostly protocol independent, and allow us to easily manipulate the transition 
system in such a way that it remains consistent, and retains all information 
we consider important. 
We break our entire system down as follows: 
• A run of the entire system is called a trace. 
e A trace is a list of transitions. 
• Each transition is represented as a start state, a message, and an end 
state. 
• States contain a pair, message and history. 
• Messages are defined as a source host, destination host, and an associ-
ated field. 
• Fields are broken down as some combination of trivial tokens, encryp-
tion, hashing, signatures and certificates. 
• State history is a simple list of messages. This information is main-
tained in the state for simplicity, but is also available by walking back-
wards through the trace. 
We break down messages into two classes: processes and communica-
tions. A process is any message from the input which defines the structure 
of the protocol, such as Process from Figure 3.4. Anything involving any 
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of the operators ; , I or + is thus a process. A communication is any mes-
sage which defines something literally sent between two hosts. The messages 
stored in state history will always be communications, as they indicate what 
has been transmitted between the hosts. Using the sample protocol defined 
in Figure 3.4, we demonstrate the encoding of each element of this proto-
col in Figure 3.6. The messages Message_1 and Message_2 are thus both 
communications, whereas Protocol is a process. 
isProtocol(processr) : 
:3 process1 , process2 : Process 
isMessage1 (process1) 1\ 
isMessage2 (process2) 1\ 
processr = Sequence(processu process2 ) 
isMessage1 (processr) : 
process?'= said(A, B, {A, enc(K1 , X)}) 
isMessage2 (processr) : 
processr = said(B, A, {B, enc(K2 , X)}) 
Figure 3.6: Sample Message Encoding 
As previously shown in Figure 3.3, we can decompose our protocol into a 
hierarchy of messages. Once we have broken our protocol down, we can now 
work with it in a much more manageable state. However, we are normally 
only interested in the topmost definition, isProtocol in this case, as it is the 
root of the tree, and thus the process which defines the entire protocol. With 
this pseudo-tree structure, we can quite easily break down our proofs, i.e. 
where we would like to have a universally quantified predicate supposition 
over the entire protocol, we can now break that down into n universally 
quantified proofs, one for each distinct communication message. Using these 
proofs, we can then walk up the tree, proving our supposition at each node 
via the proofs of its children. 
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3.3.2 State Transition 
We have now described the overall layout of a protocol trace. However, we 
need to be able to build on these traces, extending them as the protocol 
communication progresses. For this we have the concept of a move, defined 
in Figure 3.7. That is, a transition from one process to another over a certain 
message. These two processes form half of the state information discussed 
earlier. For implementation issues we require the idea of a blank process, that 
is a process which cannot perform any messages, or be transformed in any 
way. This is simply for technical implementation reasons and has no impact 
on our methods. We use these blank messages to describe a terminated 
process, which is similar to the 0 process in CCS. 
move[processj(PI, P2, M) : 
( P1 = M) ::::} P2 = Blank 
(PI= P1algb) ::::} (move(Pla, Px, M) 1\ P2 = PxiPib) V 
(move(Pib, Px, M) 1\ P2 = PlaiPx) 
(P1 = Ha + Plb) ::::} move(Pla' P2, M) V 
move(Pib, P2, M) 
(P1 = P1ai P1b) ::::} (Pla =Blank 1\ move(Plb, P2, M)) V 
(move(Pla, Px, M) 1\ P2 = Px; P1b) 
Figure 3.7: Move 
We do not actually use move directly, but we have built another predicate 
on top of it which manipulates states and history correctly, as shown in 
Figure 3.8. We use two separate predicates here, since states contain more 
than just process information; they also contain a history of previously seen 
messages. 
Using the state move predicate we can now easily move through the pro-
tocol from the initial process description generated from the protocol defini-
tion. One last modification that must be made is in protocol initialisation. 
We have no restriction on the number of rounds of a protocol that can be 
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move(state] (81, 82, M) : 
move(process] (81[process], 82(process], M) 1\ 
82[history] = 81[history] U M 
Figure 3.8: State Move 
run, and thus have added the ability for protocols to be started at any point 
throughout a trace. Therefore our trace begins with the root process for the 
given protocol, from which we can either continue to run as a single protocol, 
or add new runs as needed. We are allowed to start another parallel run of 
the protocol at any time. This ensures that exposures of information in one 
round will not affect any subsequent protocol run. This allows us to model 
multi-round attacks. 
We can demonstrate this using the protocol shown in Figure 3.9. This 
is a simple linear two-message protocol. Initially we would begin with the 
root process for the protocol, P1; P2. From here we choose to perform the 
P1 move, leaving only the P2 message. Now, we instantiate a second round 
of the protocol, and shift on its first message; P1. It should be noted that 
we never see the entire process for subsequent rounds, since we immediately 
shift on their first message. Thus our second process immediately becomes 
P2, as the initial P1 was consumed in the move. We now have two protocols 
running in parallel, each with only the P2 message remaining. We shift on 
the second instance's P2 message, and then on the first's. This brings us to 
a blank state, although we could begin a new run. We could continue to 
create additional runs indefinitely. Thus, there is no limit on how many runs 
a given protocol will execute, allowing the Spy to model multi-round attacks. 
An example of a multi-round run is shown in Figure 3.10. 
We can describe this in more concrete terms. If hosts A1 and B1 are 
engaged in a run of the protocol, there is nothing to stop a second pair of 
hosts, A2 and B2, from communicating at the same time. These two commu-
nications are completely unrelated, and since there are no timing constraints 
in our system, they run at independent speeds. There is also no restriction 
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P PI;Pz 
PI A--+ B: MI 
Pz B--+ A: M2 
Figure 3.9: Multi-round Protocol Sample 
Figure 3.10: Multi-round Protocol Run 
on starting time. Thus the second protocol run may begin at the same time 
as the first, after the first has completed its run, or at any state in between. 
Further, there is also no restriction on the hosts involved, so AI and A2 may 
be the same host, and thus knowledge uncovered from one protocol run would 
be relevant to attacks on the other. However, since we assume that only the 
Spy is malicious, we are not generally interested in what knowledge non-Spy 
hosts maintain between rounds. 
3. 3. 3 Encoding of Variables 
A problem with this method is the instantiation of the variables in the en-
coding. If we declare variables directly, in such a way that we have a variable 
in our encoding for each one declared in our input definition, then they can 
never change between protocol runs, thus giving the false impression that 
anything revealed in one transaction remains the same for all subsequent 
transactions. However, if we simply declare them as names, then it is im-
possible to force them to remain constant within a given transaction without 
passing them around to every predicate and lemma which needs their values. 
To compensate for this, variables are encoded as a mapping from hosts to 
their respective types. Thus each variable is bound to a host in the pro-
tocol. Under most conditions, this binding is relatively easy to determine, 
and relates well to the instinctive understanding of the protocol. Thus, for 
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example, public/private keys are bound to their appropriate host, etc ... 
3. 3.4 Protocol Independent Subsystem 
There are a number of fixed definitions that are applicable to every protocol 
generated. These include the data type definitions, as well as the lemmas as-
sociated with these data types relating to their internal consistency. We also 
define all of the fundamental predicates for working with these data types, 
such as reveals, as protocol independent. After the data type definitions, 
the majority of the protocol independent system definition consists of lemmas 
relating parts with reveals. An example of this is shown in Figure 3.11. 
"Yin parts(T) via X" Lemma: 
reveals (X, Y) 1\ 
X E parts(T) =? 
Y E parts(T) 
Figure 3.11: Assisting Simplification Lemma 
There are approximately fifty lemmas of this type, which are used to 
simplify the proof effort. This is done by substituting intuitive ideas with 
lemmas in order to avoid unnecessarily overloading the user with information. 
An example of these forms of lemmas is given below. It states that all revealed 
tokens must also be a member of the parts of the trace. 
V X, T : reveals(T, X) =? X E parts(T) 
3.4 Support for Proving 
3.4.1 Transition System Predicates 
The simplest of the transition system predicates is parts, which defines which 
symbols are involved in any of our data structures. For example, the value 
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X would be considered to be a member of parts of the following message: 
Host1 ---+ Host2 : X, Y, Z 
When values appear as the argument of some kind of function, encryption 
or hashing for example, they can only be a member of parts if the function 
is reversible. Thus, in the following: 
Host1 ---+ Host2 : {X} F 
X would not be a member of parts ifF was a hash function, which we assume 
to be one-way, but ifF were a key, and thus {X}F represents encryption, 
then X would be in parts, since encryption is reversible. 
The predicate parts thus defines. all symbols which are somehow ex-
tractable from a field, message or trace. Since hashing is considered to be 
one-way in our system, a hashed token is unrecoverable. However encryption 
is readily broken down, since its content is extractable. The predicate parts 
has no notion of knowledge, so it does not attempt to determine whether a 
key is known; it simply ignores the encryption. 
Following parts, we have a similar predicate called reveals. We use 
reveals to denote information that is revealed in plain text through some 
communication. Thus reveals works very similarly to parts, except it does 
not break down encryption. This is the first step towards analysing protocols 
for secrecy. Using the following protocol snippet: 
Host1 ---+ Host2 : X, {Y} K 
we would say that X is revealed. However, if K is a key, then Y is not 
revealed. It should be noted that reveals does not have to be used on 
only trivial tokens, thus in the above example we could say that {Y} K was 
revealed. 
Once we have reveals and parts, we can now build our predicate for 
knowledge. The predicate knows, as defined in Figure 3.12, allows us to walk 
through a trace, and determine whether a given host can learn a given token. 
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knows(H, T,X): 
X E parts(T) 1\ 
(reveals(T, X) V 
(3 Y : Field, K : Key : 
reveals(Y, X) 1\ 
Y E parts(T) 1\ 
knows(H, T, Y) 1\ 
knows(H, T, K))) 
Figure 3.12: The Recursive Knows Predicate 
It attempts to break down encryption, but it will only do so if the key to that 
encryption can be learnt in some way, either through some other message, or 
via initial knowledge. This concept of knows is based on Millen's encoding 
of analz [MROO]. 
This definition breaks down as follows. Initially, we require that the sym-
bol in which we are interested, X, appears at some point in the trace, in 
some readable way, X E parts(T). From here, there are two possible ways it 
could be available to a host, either directly through plain text, reveals(T, X), 
or indirectly through an encrypted message, 3 Y : field, K : Key . . . . How-
ever, this encryption may, in turn, contain an encrypted message which must 
be broken, and so on. This continual nesting of encryption is represented 
through the use of recursion in knows. We can now break down an arbitrary 
depth of encryption. Unfortunately this recursion is initially unbounded, 
since we do not know in advance how many levels we will have to search. 
This is where the predicate parts becomes important. We will eventually 
reach some state where we have n levels of encryption, i.e. 
However, for any given protocol there are a finite number of message 
types, and associated with each of them is a finite depth of encryption. Thus 
32 
each protocol will have some maximal n for which there cannot possibly exist 
any deeper encryption. This deeper level of encryption cannot therefore be 
covered by parts, and the first aspect of knows will now fail. This is how we 
prevent knows from perpetually attempting to increase the encryption depth. 
3.4.2 Initial Knowledge 
We encode the initial knowledge of the system as axioms relating to hosts. 
Thus for any given host, there exists an axiom which ensures that the knows 
predicate is satisfied for its initial knowledge. These axioms are defined 
directly from the Initial section of the protocol definition. For example, 
given the specification shown in Figure 3.13, the axioms generated would be 
as shown in Figure 3.14. 
Initial 
Knows(A) = K_A, K_A', K_P 
Figure 3.13: Sample Initial Knowledge Specification 
"Initial Knowledge for A" Axiom : 
V T: Trace: 
knows(A, T, K _A) 
knows(A, T, K _A') 
knows( A, T, K _P) 
Figure 3.14: Sample Initial Knowledge Axioms 
3.5 Secrecy Lemma Generation 
Secrecy lemmas can be broken into two broad categories: message based, 
and protocol based. Message based lemmas relate to a single message and do 
not require any information about their position in the protocol as a whole. 
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Protocol based lemmas do not deal with individual messages at all, but rather 
how these messages relate to form the overall system. 
There are two sets of lemmas generated for message based secrecy. The 
first set, key secrecy, is quite general, and does not need to be regenerated 
for each individual secrecy theorem. The second set, token secrecy, relates 
highly to the secrecy lemma for which they were defined. This second set 
thus appears once for every secrecy lemma defined, whereas the first set will 
appear only once per protocol. 
3.5.1 Key Secrecy 
It should be noted that our current system assumes that no key will ever be 
revealed in plain text, as this would render such a key useless for encryption 
purposes. This assumption could cause problems were any protocol to reveal 
any of its keys, and in such a scenario it would be necessary to decompose 
the key secrecy lemmas further, so that rather than dealing with all keys as 
a whole, this protocol deals with them individually, ignoring any keys which 
were revealed in plain text. This would not severely influence any of the later 
results, but would increase the effort involved in proving the initial lemmas. 
The key secrecy lemmas are of the form shown in Figure 3.15. These are 
fairly easily proven, since they deal only with the revealing of the key in 
plain text. 
"M does not reveal any key" Lemma : 
\;/ K: Key: •reveals(M, K) 
Figure 3.15: Key Secrecy Lemmas 
Token Secrecy 
Token secrecy is very similar to that for keys, except we can now no longer 
generalise it for an entire class of variables. This gives us a group of lemmas 
for each token relating to individual messages, similar to those for key secrecy 
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shown in Figure 3.15, as well as a final lemma proven using those in this 
group. An example of this final lemma encoded for a nonce, N, is shown in 
Figure 3.16. These lemmas would only be generated for those tokens which 
have been declared secret in the input file. 
"No trace reveals N" Lemma: 
V T : Trace : valid(T) ::::} •reveals(T, N) 
Figure 3.16: Final Token Secrecy Lemma 
3.5.2 Global Secrecy Theorem Structure 
While it is useful to generate all these individual lemmas, what we require 
is a few high level lemmas which can be used in many scenarios very easily. 
We thus build a hierarchy of lemmas as shown in Figure 3.17. From this 
figure we can see that the protocol dependent lemma generation is then 
abstracted into a protocol independent lemma, i.e. the individual message 
key secrecy lemmas can be used to prove the general message key secrecy 
lemma. Since the individual lemmas are protocol dependent, it is hard to 
generalise their use, as they will change between different protocols. Thus, 
when we combine them into a generalised lemma, we now have a base on 
which we can build generic proofs that will work under any protocol, once 
the individual messages have been used appropriately. 
From Figure 3.17, we can see that the proof of the secrecy theorem, 
as shown in Figure 3.17(a), can be readily broken down into more easily 
managed parts. 
Figure 3.17 (b) shows the structure of the proof pertaining to the plain 
text section of the overall theorem. Here we initially ensure that the protocol 
contains only valid messages, as this is where we bring the protocol definition 
of the messages into our system. We then must prove that none of the 
messages in the protocol reveal the given token in plain text. This is a 
simple proof, but for simplicity, and for reuse, we break this down into a 
lemma for each message, as discussed in Section 3.5.1. 
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T does not 
reveal X in 
plain text 
T does not 
reveal x at 
1-level encryption 
T does not 
reveal X at 
k-level encryption 
(a) Secrecy Lemma Breakdown 
(k+l)-level 
encryption 
is invalid 
(b) Revealed in Plain Text (c) Revealed at i-level of encryption 
(d) n+llevels of encryption is invalid 
Figure 3.17: Secrecy Theorem Proof Hierarchy 
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Figure 3.17( c) shows the general case for each level of encryption. For 
a simple protocol involving only a single level of encryption, there would 
be one lemma of this type. However, most protocols involve at least two 
levels of encryption, especially protocols which involve three or more hosts, 
and, as such, there could be several of these lemmas. These lemmas are 
the most complex portion of the secrecy proof. They are broken down into 
two basic parts: finding all fields encrypted at the relevant depth, and then 
proving that these fields do not violate our secrecy criteria. Finding the field 
is a simple brute force task, since we can simply instantiate every message 
in the protocol, examining their contents until we find a list of appropriate 
candidates. We then take these candidates individually, and prove that they 
do not violate our criteria. There are two ways this could be proven: either 
the message does not contain the relevant token, or the key involved in the 
encryption is safe. Proving it does not contain the relevant token is trivial, 
and is done automatically. However, proving that the key is safe is difficult. 
We can isolate this proof off with its own lemma, and prove it separately, in 
a similar manner, except this time the token in which we are interested is 
the appropriate key. 
Figure 3.17(d) shows the final step in the secrecy theorem proof. Once 
we have exhausted all the depths of encryption, we need a method to inform 
the theorem prover that we are in fact completed. We thus have a short 
final lemma which states that there is no encryption above a certain level in 
this protocol, so there is no point in attempting to search for it. This proof 
is quite short, but due to its raw nature, it is not easy to automate in an 
elegant way (although it is automated in an inelegant way). 
Further discussion on our automated techniques for this are discussed in 
Section 3. 7 .1. 
3.5.3 Protocol Based(Secrify 
Protocol based ~;~ur1ty, as implemented, is currently limited to encryption 
depth, that is, how many levels of nested encryption there are in a given 
protocol. This has been discussed earlier in Section 3.4.1. 
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3.6 Agreement Lemma Generation 
The agreement lemmas and predicates are the most complex section of the 
output encoding. With agreement, we are attempting to prove that there 
exists some run in which the agreement condition holds. Because this is not 
a universally quantified condition, we must produce a specific run of the pro-
tocol in which to test it. Since our translator is relatively simple, it does not 
have the capacity to properly evaluate which run is applicable in a reasonable 
amount of time. We have thus chosen the following heuristic technique. We 
first find a message which contains the given token in any extractable form, 
i.e. plain text, or encryption, but not hashing. We then backtrack from this 
message to the beginning of the protocol, selecting the appropriate choice 
and parallel processes as we go. When we have backtracked to the initial 
protocol definition, we can reconstruct the list of actual messages we have 
seen in order to obtain our prospective message. This is the initial extension 
guess which is encoded in our output. We have chosen to find the first suit-
able message, rather than the last, so that these extensions are as short as 
possible, thus reducing the amount of effort required in the proofs. It should 
be noted that the heuristic can perform rudimentary analysis of the protocol 
to ensure it does not get confused by protocol complexities such as looping 
and nesting. 
Once our heuristic run has been generated, there are still two additional 
sets of lemmas which we generate. As in security, we generate a set of token 
secrecy lemmas, since we generally only attempt agreement on secure tokens. 
This could cause problems for protocols in which we are attempting agree-
ment on an insecure token, as these lemmas would thus not be applicable. 
This scenario would limit the usefulness of our theorem break-down method, 
as we would no longer be able to use these lemmas. However we believe that 
making the assumption that no agreement token candidate is ever revealed in 
plain text is reasonable, as this would render the token immediately insecure, 
and could thus be easily learned via snooping. Once these secrecy lemmas 
are generated we then generate two sub-lemmas, one for each host involved 
in the agreement. This is a simple technique for splitting the final proof into 
manageable chunks. For example, if the final agreement theorem appeared 
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as shown in Figure 3.18, then we would also generate the two sub-lemmas 
shown in Figure 3.19, for host A, 3.19(a) and for host B, 3.19(a). 
"A and B agree on X" Theorem : 
V T1 : :3 T2: 
extends(T2, T1) 1\ 
(knows( A, X, T2 ) <====? knows(B, X, T2)) 
Figure 3.18: Fundamental Agreement Theorem 
"A knows X" Theorem : 
V T1: :3 T2 
extends(T2, T1) 1\ 
knows(A, X, T2 ) 
(a) Agreement assisting lemma for A 
"B knows X" Theorem : 
V T1: :3 T2 
extends(T2, T1) 1\ 
knows(B, X, T2) 
(b) Agreement assisting lemma for B 
Figure 3.19: Agreement Theorem Assisting Lemmas 
Unfortunately, however, we cannot use both of these lemmas in our final 
proof. Since the general theorem, Figure 3.18, states that there exists a 
trace which is valid for both hosts, and if we were to simply use both of these 
lemmas there is no guarantee that the traces used in Figures 3.19(a) and 
3.19(b) are the same. We can thus only use one of these lemmas in our final 
proof. Further discussion on this can be found in Section 3.6.3. 
3. 6.1 Heuristic Example 
Using the protocol shown in Figure 3.20, our heuristic extension generation 
would initially attempt to find the token of interest, Data, in a suitable 
message. In this case SendData contains the token. It would then back-
track from here to Heuristic, where it would discover that it needs to have 
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performed the Negotiateidentities process first. It would then unfold 
Negotiateidentities, discovering that FirstA, and ThenB are both needed, 
so they would be prepended to the run. Finally it would discover that it is 
at the beginning of Heuristic, and that this is the root process, so there is 
no further discovery necessary. This would result in the run being: FirstA 
---+ ThenB ---+ SendData, as we would anticipate. 
Heuristic 
N egotiateldenti ties 
First A 
Th.enB 
SendData 
Negotiateldentities; SendData 
FirstA; ThenB 
A---+ B: {A}K 
B---+ A: {B}K 
A---+ B: {Data}K 
Figure 3.20: Agreement Extension Heuristic Example 
Having constructed a possible extension, we still need the assisting lem-
mas for the final proof. We initially simply construct lemmas ensuring that 
the extension we have provided is a valid trace of the protocol. Theoretically 
these lemmas are guaranteed to be true, and thus proving them is not vital. 
However, to ensure the validity of the tool, and of our heuristic algorithm, we 
do prove them. This distinction is maintained in the PVS encoding through 
the use of axioms versus lemmas. We generally assume axioms will be true, 
without the need for proof. We instantiate these lemmas in the final proof 
for agreement when required to provide a valid extension. Apart from the 
extension lemmas, there is only one additional class of lemma produced for 
agreement: the requirement that the agreement token be at least partially 
concealed by encryption. While it is not a requirement in the strictest sense, 
it is highly unlikely that any protocol would ever be interested in the agree-
ment of any non-encrypted token. If this were the case, these lemmas would 
simply have to be ignored. 
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3. 6. 2 Agreement Heuristic Limitations 
While this technique works well for simple agreement tokens, it can be shown 
to be insufficient under certain more advanced protocols. We can demon-
strate the flaw in the above heuristic algorithm using the test protocol defined 
in Figure 3.21. 
ExtensionFlaw 
SendEncrypted 
SendKey 
SendEncrypted; SendKey 
A-+ B: {Data}K 
- A-tB:K 
Figure 3.21: Extension Heuristic Flaw Example 
In our example, we would heuristically guess that the message which 
revealed Data to host B would be SendEncrypted, since this is where the 
token is first seen. We would then generate the extension to this message 
only. However, this is not the message at which B would be able to agree 
with A on the token, as the encryption key is currently not known. Thus the 
actual extension we require for the proof would be all messages up to, and 
including, SendKey. 
We investigated attempting to counter this by always delaying the ex-
tension until we have negotiated both the token and its key, but often the 
key for the agreement is either initial knowledge, or is negotiated in a fairly 
complex handshaking sequence. The effort involved in decoding these trans-
actions is more suited to the theorem proving system, as it has all of the 
relevant encoding details available, whereas our translator does not contain 
very advanced protocol analysis abilities. Another possible method we might 
use is to simply delay our extensions until they have reached the end of the 
protocol. This, however, is also flawed, since we cannot guarantee that a 
given protocol will ever terminate; some are recursive. We desire minimal 
extensions, since the larger they are, the more effort we must expend in the 
theorem proving tool trying to prove them. 
Thus we have used a heuristic technique, and have had satisfactory re-
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suits. It should be noted that we can normally take our automatically gen-
erated extension and easily manipulate it in the theorem proving tool to 
generate a different extension. This ease of modification means that should 
we guess wrong in the translation, the semi-automated proof will fail. This 
will l;>e visible to the operator, and will be easily identifiable as either a flaw 
in the extension generation, or possibly a flaw in the logic of the protocol 
relating to agreement. 
3. 6. 3 Global Agreement Theorem Structure 
Our agreement theorem proof structure is not as rigidly defined as that for 
secrecy, as we now deal with two scenarios: either one of the agreement hosts 
knows the token using initial knowledge, or not. In the first scenario, the 
final theorem proof is quite simple, once the supporting lemmas have been 
completed. The structure of this is shown in Figure 3.22(a). Here, we can 
instantiate the agreement sub-lemma for the host who does not learn the 
token from initial knowledge, A in the case of the figure, which then trivially 
removes half of the work. The other half is then removed via the initial 
knowledge axioms for the other host, B in this case. This is the simpler of 
the two agreement scenarios. 
In the second scenario, we have neither host knowing the token in their 
initial knowledge; both learn it from some third party. In this case, we can 
still use our agreement sub-lemmas, but additional work is required. The 
structure of this scenario is shown in Figure 3. 22 (b). Here, we must choose 
an extension in which both hosts can learn the token. This may be generated 
by the heuristic algorithm, but if it is not, it is not difficult to modify. Once 
this extension is generated, we can then use the sub-lemmas for agreement 
to show that for one of the two hosts, this extension allows the host to learn 
the given token. These sub-lemmas are simply used to break the proof down 
into more manageable chunks. They are not reused multiple times and so 
will not decrease the CPU requirements of a given proof. We can now use 
the appropriate sub-lemma to remove half of the agreement proof. Next 
we must prove that our extension allows the second host to learn the token 
of interest. For technical reasons we are unable to break this second proof 
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(a) Agreement Proof Scenario 1 
Agreement of Token X 
between Hosts A and B 
(b) Agreement Proof Scenario 2 
Figure 3.22: Agreement Proof Scenarios 
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off into a subsidiary lemma, and must prove it inline in the main theorem. 
Since there is little other work involved in this theorem, only a few protocol 
independent tree nodes, this does not interfere much, and is easily automated. 
This second proof may involve ensuring various keys are correctly learned for 
the host to learn the token, as we can see in the right-most leaf nodes of 
Figure 3.22(b). 
There are two causes of difficulty in both the agreement sub-lemma proofs, 
and in the right leaf nodes of the final theorem proof. When the agreement 
token is found, it is most likely to be encrypted with some key or keys. This 
initially causes some difficulty. Each of these keys will have to be shown to 
be known to the host, either through initial knowledge, or via some other 
message. In some scenarios these keys may in turn be encrypted. This 
process can continue for some time before all are shown to be known. It 
is possible to break off the proofs for individual keys into sub-lemmas, but 
we have not done this automatically, as evaluating which keys are candidates 
for this involves considerable analysis of the protocol structure. We currently 
split these into separate sub-lemmas by hand if it is required. 
3. 7 Strategies 
The auto-generation of supporting lemmas and the transition system provides 
the basis for our proofs, but does not minimise the effort of proving them. We 
require a scripting mechanism for this final step of automation. The theorem 
proving tool, PVS, allows us such a mechanism in the form of strategies. 
PVS strategies are small sections of PVS prover commands, which also 
allow general LISP [Ste84] code. PVS contains all the infrastructure for im-
plementing these directly into the proof system since many of the standard 
PVS commands are implemented as strategies using the core library. This 
leaves us with the task of generating our own appropriate strategies. Cur-
rently we have managed to write entirely generic strategies, not requiring 
any protocol specific information, thus allowing us to keep the same set of 
strategies for all proofs. However, it is likely that, as the system is extended, 
cases could arise in which generic strategies would be either impossible or too 
complex to be feasible. It would be a simple matter to add the generation 
44 
5 
10 
of these more complex strategies to the translation tool. Currently we have 
avoided auto-generation by supplying our strategies with optional arguments 
which define any protocol specific features in which we are interested. 
3. 7.1 Secrecy Strategies 
The template we use for secrecy is quite simple. We continue to increase the 
depth of encryption that we are seeking, proving at each level that the token 
remains secret. At some point we will reach a depth of encryption which 
does not appear at all in the protocol, and thus the remainder of the proof 
is trivially true. This structure has already been discussed in Figure 3.17. 
We have already broken this down into a series of lemmas, as discussed 
earlier in Section 3.5, and thus we can use these previously proven lemmas 
to solve each of the branches. The initial, zero-level encryption depth branch 
is easily solved using the auto-generated reveals lemma for the token of 
interest. For example, using the protocol shown in Listing 3.1, we would 
have the following zero-level encryption depth lemma auto-generated for the 
secrecy of Y between hosts A and B: 
"Y safe at zero-level" Lemma: 
V T : Trace : •reveals(T, Y) 
Protocol 11 SampleProtocol 11 
Variables 
Initial 
Spec 
A, B : Host 
KA, KB, KC : Key 
X, Y : Natural 
Knows(A) = KA, KA', 
Knows(B) = KA, KB, 
KB, KC 
KB', KC 
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Secret (Y, [A, B]) 
15 
SampleProtocol = Msgi ; Msg2 Msg3 
Msgi = A -> B X, {Y}KA' 
Msg2 = B -> A {Y}KB' 
Msg3 =A -> B {Y, X}KC 
20 ------------------------------------------------------
Listing 3.1: Sample Protocol 
This is proven automatically via two other lemmas. The first states that 
all messages in a transaction must be valid protocol messages, since in our 
model the Spy is passive, and the second states that no valid message reveals 
Y. This second lemma is proven in terms of the secrecy lemmas for each 
individual message. We can prove the individual message theorems using a 
simple strategy. This strategy iterates through the body of the message, and 
ensures that none of the plain text tokens in the message are the token of 
interest. Since this does not involve encryption, this can be done very simply. 
The PVS code for this strategy is shown in Listing 3.2. 
(defstep message_reveals (msg) 
(then 
5 
(skosimp) 
(rewrite msg) 
(replace -1) 
10 
(repeat* (rewrite "reveals" -2)) 
(assert) 
) 
"message_reveals" "message_reveals ") 
Listing 3.2: Message Reveals Strategy 
The message reveals strategy is quite simple; it instantiates the message, 
and rewrites it to bring the message details into a manageable place. It then 
repeatedly removes the head of the list of tokens, thus creating a conjunction 
of boolean values corresponding to whether a certain token in the list was 
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the token of interest. Since we are hoping that this is never the case, this 
will simply be a list of false items, and thus the final assert will reduce this 
conjunction to the single term false, and the proof is then complete. 
The use of the constants, -1 and -2 denote statement numbers to be 
manipulated, as discussed in Section 2.2.1. They can be removed through the 
use of the PVS command gather-seq, which can perform a form of pattern 
matching to discover which particular statements are desired. However, in 
the case of most of our strategies the scenarios are quite limited, and thus 
do not vary enough for these constant values to cause problems. 
This is actually the most complex strategy for the zero-level encryption 
branch, since we now no longer have to deal with the specific details of the 
contents of a protocol's messages. Once we have proven that no individual 
message reveals the token we can then :prove that, since all valid traces of the 
system are made up of these messages, no valid trace can reveal the token. 
We will not go into the details of this strategy. It is simply a matter of 
instantiating all the individual message lemmas. 
The zero-level encryption lemma is now proven, and can be used in the 
secrecy theorem strategy to solve the left-most branch of the proof. We then 
have n lemmas auto-generated for the depth of the protocol. Thus, in our 
example from Listing 3.1, we only have a single depth of encryption, that is, 
there are no messages which contain nested encryption. We would therefore 
generate only one lemma relating to encryption depth, as follows: 
"Y safe at depth 1" Lemma : 
V T: Trace,K: Key,F: Field: 
reveals(T, FK) ::::} 
•reveals(F, Y) V 
•knows ( S, T, K) 
For the i-levellemmas in general, the strategy for their proofs is as follows. 
Initially, we break down the trace into the individual message components, 
that is, if the protocol reveals something at 1-level, then there must be at 
least one message which reveals it at this depth. Once we have this, we then 
47 
have n branches to the proof, one for each message in the protocol. Given 
a trace T, and a token of interest F, each of these branches would be of the 
following form: 
reveals(Message1, {Yl}K1 ) 1\ 
reveals(Yl, {Y2}K2 ) 
reveals(Yi-1, {1-i} K; =} 
•reveals (1-i, F) V 
•lmows(Spy, T, K 1) V 
These portions can also be broken off into sub-lemmas for each message, 
which state that, for each message, either the i-level encryption does not 
appear in the body of the message, or the keys to the encryption are never 
known. We have currently only partially automated the proofs for these 
lemmas. Our strategies will currently automatically prove all cases where the 
above reveals example does not apply, that is, if a message does not reveal 
the given token in i levels of encryption, then it is proven automatically. 
If this fails, then the operator is left to complete the proof. This partial 
automation does, however, quickly highlight the core of the problem, so that 
the operator does not have to deal with trivial cases. Using all of these sub-
lemmas, it is now simple to instantiate them appropriately on each of the 
n branches. Thus, for i-level encryption we currently only offer a partially 
automated analysis. The strategy we use for i-level is very similar to that 
for zero-level, and is shown in Listing 3.3. 
(defstep i_level_reveals (msg) 
(then 
(skosimp) 
(rewrite msg) 
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(replace -1) 
(repeat* (rewrite 11 reveals 11 -2)) 
(then 
(split) 
10 (repeat* (flatten)) 
) 
) 
"i_level_reveals 11 "i_level_reveals 11 ) 
Listing 3.3: i-level Secrecy Strategy 
In this strategy we simply break down the message into a list of candidate 
tokens. These candidates are simply encrypted tokens. We then split this 
into a set of leaf nodes which need to ~e proven. If there are no candidates 
(as in the trivial case), then the proof would be complete. For example, if 
we were analysing a 3-level encryption depth, we would break the message 
down, discovering all of the 3-level encryption tokens, which would then be 
presented to the operator. We can see that this removes the tedium from the 
operator, leaving only likely candidates to be dealt with. 
The main difference between this strategy and the zero-level one is in the 
(then ... ) block. This block simply iterates through every leaf node of the 
system, flattening all boolean statements. This is used to convert statements 
of the form TRUE ~ FALSE ~ TRUE into FALSE, and trivially eliminates all 
those which fail. This removes most of the tedium from the operator, as all 
of the trivial cases are automatically proven. 
Finally, as we have previously discussed, we would also generate the ter-
minating lemma, ensuring that our recursive definition of knows will have a 
finite depth. This is defined as: 
"SampleProtocol has maximal depth of 1" Lemma : 
V T: Trace, K1, K 2 : Key, Yi, }2, Y3 :Field: 
reveals(Y3, {Y2}K2 ) 1\ 
reveals (Y2, {Yi} K 1 ) =? 
•Y3 E parts(T) 
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In summary, we can thus automatically prove the zero-level encryption 
lemma, and the maximal encryption depth lemma, and have partially auto-
mated the i-level encryption depth lemmas. Once these are proven we can 
trivially prove the final secrecy theorems. 
3. 7. 2 Agreement Strategies 
Agreement does not break down into such a simple structure as secrecy, 
because it is a liveness, rather than safety, property. As a liveness property, 
agreement does not necessarily hold true over the entire run over a protocol, 
only in specific states. Thus the first task we must attempt is to find these 
states. Thus is currently done heuristically, as discussed in Section 3.6. In our 
strategies, a completely automated technique for dealing with agreement has 
yet to be developed. The fundamental problem we currently face is the size 
of the proof trees. Agreement involves a large amount of rewriting, because 
we have a specific trace in mind with which we are dealing, and thus we have 
to maintain a large amount of code for dealing with this trace. Since it is 
a specific trace instance, rather than an abstract instance, we have a large 
number of tokens in our tree in which we are not particularly interested, but 
must retain to ensure the integrity of the trace. These tokens are generally 
messages which do not contribute at all to the agreement property. Normally 
in a trace there are one, possibly two, messages of interest for a specific 
agreement property. However, the trace to reach these messages may consist 
of as much as the entire protocol, which, in the case of a large protocol such 
as SET, would be too much for the computer to work with comfortably. 
The overwhelming amount of useless data this causes is currently handled 
simply by manually hiding all data which is of no interest. Unfortunately, 
we currently have no automated technique for guessing what is useful, and 
so this requires human intervention. 
However, although the overall structure of the proof remains unscripted, 
we do have a model for it, and have constructed strategies for proving both 
its subsidiary lemmas, and portions of the final proof. Most of the lemmas 
used in agreement are shared with secrecy, as most of the time we are simply 
informing the system that a given message does not contain the token in 
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which we are interested. We are thus left with a set of candidate messages. 
One of these should be the message which reveals the token to the target 
host. Therefore two classes of messages remain: messages which reveal the 
token as desired, and those which contain it, but do not reveal it to the 
target host. The overall focus of our strategies has generally been to attempt 
to automatically prove sections which consist of either mundane details and 
thus are of little interest to the user, or are very frequently used and thus 
constitute a large portion of the overall workload. In this case, using a 
breadth first search, we have targeted the messages that do not reveal the 
given token, as they are of little interest to the user. However, since our trace 
is not guaranteed to be finite in length, we cannot use the standard brute 
force technique. Therefore a guided technique is used, in which the operator 
must choose the appropriate path. 
In summary, high level strategies for dealing with agreement are yet to 
be developed, but we do have a wide variety of small, specific strategies for 
simplifying the operator's interaction. 
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Chapter IV 
Case Studies 
4.1 General Comments 
The design of our translation system has been tested using two protocols, 
N etBill and SET, as case studies to determine appropriate properties of in-
terest. Two protocols have been used to ensure that the system was not 
heavily biased towards one style. Preliminary analysis of two other pro-
tocols, Millicent [Man95] and IKE [HC98], was also begun. However, the 
analysis of these is incomplete compared to the other two, and therefore is 
not included in this thesis. Both of the chosen protocols are e-commerce 
protocols, and are designed for the transferring of either money or goods in 
a secure way. We do not believe that this has caused any form of bias in 
these results towards e-commerce protocols, since, due to the abstraction of 
the specific data involved, they are very similar to more standard security 
protocols, such as IKE. 
4.2 Secure Electronic Transaction - SET 
The SET [VIS97] protocol is a highly specialised, secure, e-commerce system. 
It was jointly designed by VISA and Mastercard, as well as a number of other 
large computer industry players, such as Microsoft and Intel. It is one of 
the largest secure transfer protocols with respect to the number of message 
variations. The full definition of SET is just under 1000 pages, with 260 pages 
for the protocol description, 630 pages for the programming description, and 
80 pages for a business management overview. Only a small subset of the 
full protocol has been analysed for our case study. 
SET is often compared to the TLS [DA99] protocol when used for e-
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commerce style business applications, although it differs in its fundamental 
design concepts. SET uses highly selective encryption [TY98], whereas TLS 
is a data independent protocol, and, as such, encrypts all data, providing 
a secure stream. SET uses only partial encryption to provide for higher 
throughput at a lower per transaction cost. 
SET is a highly application specific protocol, with separate message hand-
shakes for each of its numerous tasks. These tasks are very fine grained; for 
example it contains a set of messages relating specifically to booking rooms 
in hotels. This fine-grained nature is what makes SET so large, and also 
makes it difficult to model as an entire system. 
The notation used in the SET description differs from the standard pro-
tocol description notation, and a high degree of familiarity with the protocol 
and its conventions is reqp.ired to convert the standard description into the 
CAPSL-like syntax required by our translator. This conversion took approx-
imately sixteen hours for the subset we describe in Section 4.2.1. However 
this includes the initial difficulties with the SET description language, and 
would thus be lower for subsequent encodings. The SET description is also 
broken down into very small logical chunks, which are reused many times. 
This fragmentation means that we would also be able to reuse sections of 
our encoding in subsequent descriptions, which would decrease the time and 
effort involved in converting from their input language to ours. 
4.2.1 SET Protocol Description Encoding 
The full description of the SET protocol subset we have used is shown in 
Listing 4.1. Initially all public keys, KC and KM, are known to all hosts, private 
keys KM' and KC' are known to their respective hosts only, and CardiD, the 
secret credit card number is known only to the customer, C. These features 
are shown in the Initial section of our description. We have three security 
properties of interest in SET, all of which relate to secrecy. The first two are 
both simple key secrecy, that private keys should remain private. The final 
secrecy property relates to the semantics of the protocol itself, that CardiD 
should remain a secret between the merchant and the customer. These are 
all shown in the Spec section of the description. 
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Protocol 11 SET 11 
Variables 
5 KM, KC : Key 
ID, CardiD, Amount, ReqiD, ChallengeC, 
ChallengeM, BankNo: Natural 
SigC, SigM: Signature 
DD, SHA : Hash 
w EXNonce : Nonce 
C, M : Host 
Initial 
Knows(M) = KM, KC, KM' 
15 Knows(C) = KM, KC, KC', CardiD 
Knows(S) = KM, KC 
Spy 
Observation, Synthesis 
20 
Spec 
Secret (KC', C) 
Secret (KM', M) 
Secret ( CardiD, [M • C]) 
25 
# Payment Messages (See Page 71 of SET manual) 
SET = PinitReq ; PinitRes ; PReq 
w PinitReq = C -> M : ReqiD, ChallengeC, BankNo 
PinitRes = M -> C : ChallengeM, {ChallengeM}SigM 
PReq = PReqDualSigned + PReqUnsigned 
# Dual Signed 
a5 PReqDualSigned = PIDualSigned 
# PIHead: Page 37 
# PIHead = ID, Amount, CardiD 
# OIData = ID, SHA(Amount) 
OIDualSigned 
~ # PI-OILink = PIHead, DD (OIData) -- L (PIHead, OIData) 
# PIDualSigned Page 35 
PIDualSigned = C -> M : SigC(C), {ID, Amount, CardiD, 
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# DIDualSigned: Page 77 
DD (ID, SHA (Amount)), 
CardiD, EXNonce}KC' 
OIDualSigned = C -> M : ID, SHA (Amount), 
DD (ID, Amount, CardiD) 
so # Unsigned 
PReqUnsigned = PIUnsigned ; OIUnsigned 
PIUnsigned = C -> M : {ID, Amount, CardiD, 
DD (ID, SHA (Amount)), 
CardiD, EXNonce}KC' 
55 OIUnsigned C -> M: ID, SHA (Amount) 
Listing 4.1: SET Protocol Description 
4.2.2 Protocol Details 
The intuitive meanings of each of the protocol messages are defined as follows: 
SET This is a process element describing the structure of the protocol. In 
this case it shows how the three sub-components fit together in a simple 
sequence. 
PlnitReq Here we describe the initial request from the customer. This in-
volves request ID, which identifies the goods in which we are interested, 
a challenge, which is simply a list of supported protocols for items such 
as encryption and hashing, and finally the bank number, which is used 
as a customer identification number in the SET protocol. 
PlnitRes Here the merchant responds to a customer's request. The mer-
chant simply responds with the protocols (for hashing and encryption 
as discussed above) which the pair will use for the remainder of the 
communication. As we have assumed all hashing and encryption to be 
perfect, we are not interested in the actual details of this as we consider 
all of these algorithms to be equal. 
PReq Here we describe the final two message exchanges, which can come 
in two forms: signed and unsigned. This specifically relates to whether 
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the two hosts have a third signature authority available. This is spe-
cific to the circumstances of the transaction, and either may be used. 
This message also demonstrates the use of the non-deterministic choice 
feature of our input language. 
PReqDualSigned This is a simple structure node. Since the PReq portion 
of the protocol is a two message communication, we simply join these 
two messages to make the PReqDualSigned process. 
PIDualSigned The customer informs the merchant of the particulars of the 
order, such as the amount of the purchase and the credit card number 
to use. Since this is the signed option of the protocol, the signature of 
the customer is attached. 
OIDualSigned This message is sent to validate the PIDualSigned. It con-
tains a hash of some of the data previously sent, which the merchant 
can compute locally and then compare to the sent value to ensure the 
messages were sent safely. 
PReqUnsigned Similarly to PReqDualSigned, this process is a simple struc-
ture process denoting the two messages of the unsigned half of PReq. 
PIUnsigned This message is identical to PIDualSigned, except the cus-
tomer's signature is omitted. 
OIUnsigned This message is identical to OIDualSigned, except the digital 
digest hash is omitted. 
4. 2. 3 Secrecy Lemma and Proof Examples 
Some examples of some of the lemmas generated by our translator for the 
SET protocol are discussed below. The two secrecy properties relating to the 
keys KC' and KM' are of little interest since we have not modelled the key 
exchange section of SET, but we will examine the encoding of the secrecy of 
CardiD, the credit card number, in depth. The lemmas we will discuss are 
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shown in Figure 4.1. Initially we require the lemmas relating the secrecy of 
CardiD to each specific message, as discussed in Section 3.5.1. An example 
of one of these lemmas is shown in Figure 4.1(a). From the eight message 
dependent lemmas, we then generate a generalised lemma about all valid 
messages. This is, in turn, used to prove a lemma relating to all traces, 
shown in Figure 4.1(b). This is the zero-level encryption lemma we require 
for the first step of our proof. SET only contains 1-level encryption, and so 
we only require a single i-level encryption lemma, shown in Figure 4.1 (c). 
The encryption bounding lemma is not token specific, and so there would 
be only one instance of this lemma type for the entire protocol, rather than 
the three we require for other lemmas. The SET instance of this encryption 
bounding lemma is shown in Figure 4.1(d). Thus, these final three lemmas 
can now be used as the leaf nodes in our SET secrecy proof, the structure of 
which was discussed in Section 3.5.2. 
Key Secrecy in knows 
When dealing with the i-levels of encryption, as shown in Figure 4.1(c), 
there are two possible cases for any given message type: either the given 
token never occurs at the given depth, or it does appear, but the key with 
which it is encrypted is never known. The first of these two cases is proven 
simply by breaking down the message into its individual components, none 
of which are the token of interest, and thus the lemma is trivially true. 
The second case is that which takes the majority of the proving effort. In 
this case it is the statement, •knows(S, T, K) which we must prove to be 
true, or rather knows(S, T, K) must be proven false. This is again proven 
recursively, just as we are attempting to prove the overall secrecy theorem 
for CardiD. The zero-level of encryption is shown through our key secrecy 
lemmas, discussed in Section 3.5.1, and the i-level proofs are conducted in 
exactly the same manner as for any other secret token, i.e.: CardiD. Thus 
in the case of candidate messages, that is, messages which contain the given 
token at the correct encryption depth, we are required to perform another 
almost identical proof, this time on the key of interest. This is seen in the 
PIDualSigned message for SET, where CardiD appears encrypted with the 
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"CardiD safe in OIUnsigned" Lemma: 
•reveals ( 0 IU nsigned, CardiD) 
(a) CardiD secrecy in OIUnsigned message 
"CardiD safe at zero-level" Lemma : 
V T : valid(T) :=:> 
•reveals(T, CardiD) 
(b) CardiD secrecy at zero-level encryption 
"CardiD safe at 1-level" Lemma: 
VT,K,Y: 
valid(T) 1\ 
reveals(T, {Y} K) => 
•reveals (Y, CardiD) V 
•lmows(S, T, K) 
(c) CardiD safe at 1-level encryption 
"SET limited to depth 2" Lemma : 
V T, K1, K2, Y1, Y2: 
valid(T) 1\ 
reveals(Y2, Y1KJ => 
Y2K2 r/: parts(T) 
(d) SET contains maximal encryption depth 
Figure 4.1: Some SET CardiD Secrecy Lemmas 
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KC' key, which must then be proven for secrecy. Apart from the zero-depth 
portion, these key secrecy proofs are not currently extracted into full sub-
lemmas. In general there will only be a few keys which are of interest to a 
given token, and only a few messages in which they apply, so the benefits of 
proving them elsewhere are unlikely to be large. If we wished this it would 
be quite simple, since we desire almost all non-public keys to be secure. We 
could simply generate secrecy lemmas for these automatically, but most of 
the cases would be of no interest to the end user. This behaviour can also 
be emulated by adding secrecy lines for all of the keys to the input file, thus 
explicitly stating their secret nature. This is the preferred mechanism for 
keys, since it allows the operator to generate only the lemmas for keys which 
are shown to be of interest. 
Since the output PVS code from the translator does not need to be edited 
by the operator, it is a simple matter to begin a proof, and then if a key is 
discovered which must be proven secret, a single line could be added to the 
protocol definition, and the output regenerated. PVS maintains its proofs in 
a separate context, so the proof structure for all previously proven lemmas 
and theorems would still be available. 
Secrecy Breakdown 
To demonstrate how the earlier discussion of proof structure relates to the 
actual user interaction with the PVS theorem proving environment, we have 
included the proof tree which PVS generates after our proof of the KC' se-
crecy. This can be seen in Figure 4.2. If we recall the general proof model, 
shown in Figure 3.17(a), we can see that our actual proof is very simi-
lar in structure. We have three basic branches. The left-most, with the 
KC_ valid_ trace_safe node, denotes the zero encryption/reveals level. The 
central branch denotes the single level of encryption that SET contains. The 
final branch denotes the maximal encryption branch, in which we state that 
no encryption greater than one will help, since our SET subset is bounded 
to one level encryption. We have hidden some of the PVS details behind 
small strategies, which are denoted by the nodes labelled knows_reduce, 
and enc_knows_reveals. These are not complex, only four- five proof tree 
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nodes, but we have removed them as they detract from the visibility of the 
overall structure. As can be seen, the final secrecy proof is very short once 
the supporting lemmas and strategies are in place. This view also makes it 
clear which lemmas we have relied on for the proof, since they are explicitly 
mentioned with the lemma command. 
I ~ ( knows_reduce) 
~ (lemma "KC_va!J.d_trace_safe~) ~ (knows_reduce) 
~ (lemma "KC_l_level_encryption") ~ (skosimp) 
I 
~ (assert) ~ <inst -1 "ttP ~Lp "Ytl" "Htl"l 
I ~ (lemma • enc_enc_not_parts" l 
I ~ (assert) 
I ~ (inst ... ) 
I 
~ ( enc_knows_reveals) 
Figure 4.2: SET PVS Proof Tree 
Since this proof no longer has to know the exact details of the messages 
involved, we have developed a simple strategy for the final secrecy proof. We 
simply take the token of interest, KC, and the depth of the protocol, 1 in 
the case of SET, instantiate the 0-depth lemma, iterate through the depth of 
the protocol instantiating each of the various depth lemmas, and then finally 
instantiate the bounded encryption depth lemma. This strategy is quite long, 
but does not contain any interesting details. 
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4.3 NetBill 
NetBill [CTS95] is a micro-payment system, designed to allow for payments 
of fractions of a cent to be cost effective. In traditional secure payment pro-
tocols, the cost of performing the computation and transaction makes low 
valued transactions uneconomical. NetBill attempts to address this by allow-
ing for a highly simple, yet secure protocol, designed for one-off transactions 
of a small nature. The NetBill description took less than a day to convert 
into our system, the core protocol definition being only sixteen pages. We 
have not encoded some of its optional extras, such as zero cost transactions 
and the status query exchange, but we have modelled all of the base protocol. 
Originally developed by Carnegie Mellon University, NetBill was later 
sold to Cybercash, and is now available commercially from http: I /www. 
cybercash.com/ 
4.3.1 NetBill Protocol Description Encoding 
Protocol 11 NetBill 11 
Variables 
C, M, N : Host 
5 K_CN, K_CM, K_MN, K_K : Key 
IdentityN, IdentityC, IdentityM, TID, EPDID : Nonce 
MAcct, PRD, Bal, CAcct, Price, Goods : Natural 
CC : Hash 
SigN, SigM, SigC : Signature 
10 
Initial 
Knows(C) = K_CM, K_CM', 
Knows(M) = K_CM, K_CM', 
Knows(N) = K_MN, K_MN', 
15 
Spy 
Observation, Synthesis 
Spec 
w Agreement (C, N, EPOID) 
Agreement (C, M, Goods) 
K_CN, 
K_MN, 
K_CN, 
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K_CN' 
K_MN', K_K, Goods, EPOID 
K_CN' 
25 
30 
35 
40 
Secret (CAcct, [C, N]) 
Secret (MAcct, [M, N]) 
NetBill = PriceRequest ; GoodsDelivery PaymentPhase 
PriceRequest = Msg_i ; Msg_2 
Msg_1 = c -> M {IdentityC}SigC, {PRD}K_CM 
Msg_2 = M -> c {PRD, Price, TID}K_CM 
GoodsDelivery = Msg_3 j Msg_4 
Msg_3 = c -> M {IdentityC}SigC, {TID}K_CM 
Msg_4 = M -> c {Goods}K_K, {{{Goods}K_K}CC, EPOID}K_CM 
PaymentPhase = Msg_5 j Msg_6 j Msg_7 j Msg_8 
Msg_5 = C -> M {IdentityC}SigC, 
{{IdentityC, PRD, Price, EPOID}SigC}K_CM 
~ Msg_6 = M -> N {IdentityM}SigM, 
Msg_7 = N -> M 
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{{{IdentityC, PRD, Price, EPOID}SigC, 
MAcct, K_K}SigM}K_MN 
{{IdentityN, PRD, K_K, EPOID}SigN, 
{EPOID, CAcct, Bal}K_CN}K_MN 
Msg_8 = M -> C : {{IdentityM, PRD, K_K, EPOID}SigN, 
{EPOID, CAcct, Bal}K_CN}K_CM 
Listing 4.2: NetBill Protocol Description 
4.3.2 Protocol Details 
N etBill This is a simple structure message indicating how the three basic 
sections of NetBill are composed. Since this is a simple linear protocol, 
the three sections appear consecutively. 
PriceRequest For ease of understanding, and to comply with the structure 
63 
of the documentation for NetBill, we divided the protocol into three 
sub-protocols. PriceRequest is the first of these. 
Msg_l Here the customer informs the merchant of their identity, as well as 
the product item to be purchased. 
Msg_2 The merchant responds to the customer with the price, and a unique 
transaction ID. 
GoodsDelivery This is the second sub-protocol. It indicates the encrypted 
goods exchange. 
Msg_3 The customer here confirms the transaction ID with the merchant. 
MsgA Here the encrypted goods are sent to the customer, as well as a 
unique episode ID, which is used to identify the session with the NetBill 
server. 
PayrnentPhase This is the third sub-protocol. The NetBill server is intro-
duced, and is used by both the merchant and the customer to ensure 
that the transaction is authentic. 
Msg_5 The customer sends the appropriate tokens for the purchase order 
to the merchant. The tokens vital to the transaction are also signed by 
the customer. This is the last opportunity for the customer to abort 
the transaction. 
Msg_6 The merchant adds their own details to the customer's signed pur-
chase order, and forwards it on to the NetBill server. This is the key 
message in the protocol, as, at any time before this, the merchant could 
have aborted the transaction for any reason. It should be noted that 
this message contains sections signed by both customer and merchant, 
so is quite secure from forgery. 
Msg_7 The N etBill server now responds with useful information to the 
merchant, including information on what money has been transferred. 
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Some of this information is encrypted with a key which the merchant 
cannot reverse, so details such as the customer account and balance are 
not revealed. 
Msg_8 Here the merchant forwards the NetBill server's customer informa-
tion back to the customer, as well as the decryption key, also signed by 
the NetBill server. 
An interesting point about the NetBill Protocol is its use of encryption 
and signatures to forward information from the N etBill server through the 
merchant to the customer. This forwarding is done by using keys of which 
the merchant has no knowledge, to prevent the merchant from being able 
to inspect their contents. Message 8 contains an example of this. Thus, 
although the customer never directly interacts with the NetBill server, they 
can still verify that the results have not been tampered with, and can be 
assured that the communication is indeed secure. 
4.3.3 Agreement Lemma and Proof Examples 
We now analyse how the agreement properties were dealt with in NetBill. In 
particular, we are interested in the extension generation. 
As can be seen from the NetBill protocol description in Listing 4.2, we 
require agreement between the customer and the NetBill server (C and N) on 
the EPOID token. EPOID is a unique Episode Purchase Order ID. The first 
step in the protocol dependent section of agreement auto-generation is to 
develop a suitable extension in which we believe agreement occurs. From the 
protocol description we can see that the NetBill server, N, first learns of the 
EPOID in Msg_6, when it is received from the merchant. Our heuristic thus 
guesses at Msg_6 as the end point for the NetBill server extension. From the 
customer perspective, the first message in which EPOID is discussed is Msg_ 4, 
and this would thus be the end point for that extension. Due to the simple 
linear nature of the NetBill protocol, the backtracking is trivial. The final 
extension guess for the NetBill server is thus: 
Msg_1 --+ Msg_2 --+ Msg_3 --+ Msg_ 4 --+ Msg_5 --+ Msg_6 
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and for the customer: 
Msg_1 --1- Msg_2 --1- Msg_3 --1- Msg_ 4 
The lemmas to generate these extensions are shown in Figures 4.3(a) and 
4.3(b). These lemmas simply state that a given sequence of messages is a 
valid extension. They do not state anything about this extension, merely 
that it remains a valid run of the protocol. Thus, even if these are not the 
extensions of interest, due to the discussed flaw in our heuristic, we are easily 
able to modify them without affecting the remainder of the system. 
"Extension for EPOID and N" Lemma: 
VT:-::JE: 
E = [T, Msg11 Msg2 , Msg3 , Msg4 , Msg5 , Msg6]/\ 
validExtension(T, E) 
(a) NetBill Server Extension 
"Extension for EPOID and C" Lemma : 
VT:-::JE: 
E = [T, Msg1 , Msg2 , Msg3 , Msg4]/\ 
validExtension(T, E) 
(b) Customer Extension 
Figure 4.3: NetBill Agreement Extension Generation Lemmas 
Using these two lemmas, we can now instantiate these two specific runs 
into our general theorem. The general agreement theorem for this property 
is shown in Figure 4.4. 
We also break down the general lemma into two subsidiary lemmas, one 
for each host. Thus we prove that each individual host can learn the ap-
propriate token, EPOID in this case, and then use these proofs in the final 
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"C and N agree on EPOID" Theorem : 
VT:3E: 
validExtension(T, E) 1\ 
knows(C,E,EPOID) ~ 
knows(N, E, EPOID) 
Figure 4.4: NetBill EPOID Agreement Theorem 
agreement theorem. The NetBill instance for the NetBill server, N is shown 
in Figure 4.5. The lemma for the customer, C, is omitted, although it would 
be almost identical to that in Figure 4.5 except the final N would be a C. In 
this example, T represents the current. trace of the protocol, while E repre-
sents the extension that we are attempting to prove satisfies our agreement 
criteria. 
"N learns EPOID" Lemma : 
VT:3E: 
knows(N, e, EPOID) 1\ 
validExtension(T, E) 
Figure 4.5: NetBill EPOID Agreement Host Lemmas 
4.3.4 Goods Agreement: Proof Difficulties 
As we discussed in Section 3.6.2, there are protocols in which our agreement 
extension generation heuristic does not generate a suitable possibility. This 
is the case in the NetBill protocol for the Goods token. Here, the Goods 
token is sent to the customer in Msg_ 4; although the key is not divulged 
until Msg_8. This flawed heuristic causes our auto-generated extension to 
be useless. Thus, for our proof of Goods agreement, we were required to 
manually build the extension in which we were interested. In the case of 
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NetBill, a purely linear protocol, this was not difficult, as we simply added 
all messages from Msg_4 onwards to the end of the extension. However, in a 
larger non-deterministic protocol this could conceivably cause problems for 
the operator. 
4.3.5 NetBill Secrecy 
As shown in the NetBill protocol description, Listing 4.2, we have two to-
kens which we require to remain secret, CAcct, and MAcct, the customer 
account number, and the merchant account number. We will not describe 
these proofs in depth, as they are very similar to the SET Car diD proof. Net-
Bill, however, has one important difference to SET with respect to secrecy 
proofs. It contains two levels of encryption, in messages Msg_ 4, Msg_7 and 
Msg_8. This means that our final proof will have four leaf nodes, rather than 
three: zero-level encryption, 1-level encryption, 2-level encryption, and en-
cryption bounding. The 2-level encryption, and encryption bounding lemmas 
for CAcct are shown in Figures 4.6(a), and 4.6(b) respectively. 
4.4 Effort Analysis 
Two hundred theorems were required by [BMPTOO] in their analysis of Card-
holder Registration in SET. However, it is not directly comparable to our sys-
tem, since they use both a different encoding and theorem proving tool. The 
theorem proving tool used, Isabelle, requires a much deeper embedding than 
PVS, and would, as such, require a larger number of supporting theorems. 
Using the NetBill case study, specifically the CAcct secrecy, we can con-
duct some analysis on the relative effort before and after the use of our auto-
matic lemma and strategy generation. Performing one of the secrecy proofs 
without any of our lemmas or strategies took approximately twelve hours of 
interaction with the system, although according to the system logs, only six 
hours of that was on computation, the remainder was idle time during op-
erator interaction with the system. This number is still not too dependable, 
since we believe that the system began swapping memory pages to disk due 
to the huge size of the proof trees. This would have increased the time it 
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"CAcct safe at 2 level" Lemma : 
V T, K1, K2, Y1, l2: 
valid(T) 1\ 
reveals(T, {l2}K2 ) 1\ 
reveals(l2, {Yi} K 1 =} 
•reveals (Y1 , CAcct) V 
•knows(S, T, K 1) V 
---,knows(S, T, K 1) 
(a) CAcct safe at 2-level encryption 
"N etBilllimited to depth 3" Lemma : 
V T, K1, K2, K3, Yi, 12, Y3 : 
valid(T) 1\ 
reveals(Y3, l2K2 ) =} 
reveals(l2, YiKJ =} 
Y3K3 f= parts(T) 
(b) N etBill contains maximal encryption depth 
Figure 4.6: Some NetBill CAcct Secrecy Lemmas 
took to perform the computation, and since our simplified structure is small 
enough to avoid swapping, this slow down will not have been apparent. Thus 
minimising memory requirements is another benefit of using our system. 
Once we have our auto-generated lemmas, the final proof is performed in 
under a minute. However, since we have now split the proof into multiple 
lemmas, this statistic is obviously skewed as we are now working on a reduced 
problem. Thus if we take into account the proof time for all the sub-lemmas, 
we would have the new estimate of effort. We will ignore interaction time 
in these numbers, as this is difficult to measure in an operator independent 
way. 
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The simple key secrecy and token secrecy, as discussed in Section 3.5.1, 
are now proven automatically via strategies, and take approximately half a 
second each. For a single secrecy property analysis, we have a key secrecy 
lemma and a token secrecy for each message. Thus for the 8-message NetBill 
protocol, we would have sixteen lemmas generated in total for these two 
categories. All of these lemmas would thus take a total of four seconds of 
CPU time to prove. We currently prove these lemmas interactively, so each 
lemma must be selected, and then the strategy applied, thus taking additional 
interaction time. However a PVS batch mode is available in which strategies 
and partial proofs can be attached to lemmas. This batch mode allows 
us to associate the lemmas and strategies appropriately, thus removing all 
user interaction from these proofs. We have not investigated this too deeply 
however. Since our proof is not entirely automated, there will always be 
a need to enter the interactive mode to perform the final proof, and thus 
the benefits of proving half of the lemmas in batch mode, and the remainder 
interactively are not large. Were we able to fully automated secrecy, it would 
be worth investigating the use of the PVS batch mode for this. 
For 1-level encryption we took one second to prove that for each indi-
vidual message, no key was revealed in one level, and one second to prove 
the general lemma, although for N etBill this may be slightly biased, since 
CAcct never appears within one-level of encryption (only two-levels). For 
two-level encryption, which is of interest for NetBill, as CAcct appears dou-
bly encrypted in both messages Msg_7 and Msg_8, we took one second for the 
six lemmas which did not contain two-levels of encryption, and 45 seconds 
for the two that did. This is an average of twelve seconds each. Once these 
lemmas were completed, the general two-level encryption lemma proof took 
only two seconds. Finally, for maximal depth, the eight individual lemma 
proofs took two seconds, with the final generalised proof also taking two 
seconds. 
The total time taken is thus 129 seconds, slightly over two minutes. While 
this time relates strictly to the computational effort, and not user interaction, 
it is still a significant improvement over the manual encoding. As can be seen, 
the majority of the work is currently at the i-level encryption stage. This is 
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where we hope to develop additional strategies. It should also be noted that 
the message encryption depth lemmas and the key secrecy lemmas are reused 
between all of the secrecy protocols. These account for eighteen seconds of 
the total time. 
Although we have used the computation time, rather than interaction 
time, we normally see a ratio of approximately 10:1 in lemmas whose strate-
gies are incomplete, such as the 2-level encryption, and a ratio of only 1.2:1 
in those lemmas that have full strategies. We would thus anticipate taking 
somewhere in the region of fifteen minutes of real operator time to conduct 
these proofs. This figure is still significantly smaller than that seen in the 
original non-automated system. 
A summary of these statistics can be found in Figure 4.7. 
Lemma Category Analysis Time (seconds) Number of occurrences 
Key Secrecy 0.25 
Token Secrecy 0.25 
1-level encryption messages 1 
1-level encryption 1 
2-level encryption messages 12 
2-level encryption 1 
Message Encryption Depth 2 
Protocol Encryption Depth 2 
I Total time (seconds) 129 1 
Figure 4. 7: Comparative Effort Analysis 
Agreement is far less automated than secrecy, so effort analysis is of 
less interest. However, preliminary results indicate that we still see similar 
benefits in time as we do for secrecy. Most of this is due to the extension 
construction, since this would normally have to be done manually, and it 
requires a great deal of effort to construct the extension in the prover simply 
because of its code size. As we have discussed the secrecy proof for SET 
in Section 4.2.3, we will not discuss the proof of the secrecy properties for 
NetBill. 
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4.5 General Lessons 
Effort analysis implies much increased efficiency with respect to both time 
and computational effort, especially as the number of properties increases. 
While it took considerable initial effort to understand both PVS and the 
protocol descriptions themselves, we believe that this effort would be quickly 
transferable to new systems, and that the overall time to prove properties 
would be low for two or more properties. If only a single property for a 
single protocol was of interest, a hand-coded system may make things easier, 
although then, the risk of encoding errors makes the results less reliable 
unless the encoding is rigorously checked for internal consistency, as we have 
done. 
The advantages, with respect to total proof time, of breaking down the 
system into a large number of sub-lemmas are evident from the effort analysis 
shown earlier in this case study. However this technique also solves another, 
perhaps even more important problem. When proving the theorems without 
the use of supporting lemmas, it is impossible for the operator to remem-
ber the current overall state of the proof, due to its large size. PVS does 
attempt to alleviate this problem by providing an interactive tree structure 
for visualising the proof. However, this tree becomes far too slow to manip-
ulate when the proofs reach a moderate size. Thus in larger proofs it is easy 
for the operator to fail to realise that they have taken the wrong path and 
become trapped in a never ending recursion, since they have no contextual 
information to draw on. It also causes the opposite problem, where the op-
erator may believe that they are in an infinite loop, and so back up several 
steps to reattempt the proof, when in actual fact they were simply in a large 
iteration. Both of these problems are addressed by our system of breaking 
the proof down, and the automated strategies also lessen the mental load 
on the operator, allowing them to remember a larger section of the current 
context associated with the proof. 
Having used two separate protocols in our analysis, we have confidence 
in the general nature of our system. Also, due to our hand analysis of two 
other protocols, IKE and Millicent, both of which followed a similar pattern 
to N etBill and SET, we believe that our overall structure is sufficiently generic 
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to accommodate most reasonable security protocols. 
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Chapter V 
Conclusions and Future Work 
5.1 Conclusions 
We have developed a system which allows the translation of a protocol de-
scription given in a modified CAPSL/Casper notation, into a formal descrip-
tion for the theorem proving tool PVS. This translation generates a state 
transition system, and associated rules to describe the action of the proto-
col. It also automatically produces theorems describing the desirable security 
properties of the protocol, and lemmas describing subsets of these theorems, 
which are used to assist in the final proofs. 
Our translation tool is fully automated. The input language is also simple, 
and although it deviates from the CAPSL format, it is sufficiently similar to 
the core language to be easily recognised. Thus the only section requiring in-
depth knowledge and time is the interaction with the PVS protocol encoding. 
Our attempts to automate this fall into two broad categories, lemmas and 
strategies. We break down the proofs into manageable lemmas, and then 
attempt to automatically prove as many of these as possible using prewritten 
PVS /LISP strategies. Our lemma design is the basic step, and the strategies 
are then written to conform to this design. 
5.1.1 Secrecy 
For secrecy, there are two general classes of lemmas generated: key secrecy 
and token secrecy. For token secrecy, we are interested in those tokens which 
are defined as being secure in the input protocol definition. For keys, we 
assume that no key is revealed by a valid protocol run, although we do 
not make assumptions about the Spy's initial knowledge. These two classes 
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of lemmas are almost identical in their definitions, simply stating that no 
message transmits the token of interest in a non-encrypted form. This is 
discussed as reveals, in Section 3.3.4. From our overall proof structure, 
we see that these lemmas will provide us with the basis of our zero-level 
encryption system, as shown in Figure 3.17. 
Dealing with 1-level encryption is more complex than for zero-level en-
cryption. We now have to consider the case where a key is revealed in one 
message, to be used in another. This means we can no longer break the pro-
cess down into a message based system; we have to deal with the protocol as 
a whole. These lemmas are approximately twice as complex, with respect to 
proof effort, as those relating to zero-level encryption. 
After 1-level encryption we simply progress through, dealing with as many 
depths as required until we have reached the maximal depth for our protocol. 
For example the NetBill protocol contains doubly nested encryption. We thus 
need to go as far as two levels in these lemmas, as the third case would simply 
not be part of the protocol. This stopping criterion is encoded in a maximal 
depth lemma. This lemma states that there cannot be any combination of 
fields, such that three levels of encryption result, as this does not occur in the 
protocol. Thus any field which involves more than this level can immediately 
be disregarded, as it cannot be part of a conforming trace. We can again 
break up this encryption rule. Since encryption is confined to one message, 
we simply break it down on a message by message basis. Using all of these 
above lemmas, we have removed a large amount of user intervention from 
the proofs of both SET and NetBill. Our techniques now allow the user to 
focus on the core problems in the protocol, as these are the places where the 
standard strategies will fail, leaving the user in a state which causes the tool 
problems. As these problems are overcome the strategies can be updated 
to reflect these advances. However it is important to maintain the protocol 
independent nature of the strategies, and thus not all aspects of a specific 
proof may be generalisable enough to be applicable. 
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5.1. 2 Agreement 
We have not been as successful with agreement as we have been with secrecy, 
as agreement is a type of liveness property, which are generally harder to 
prove. However, we have identified a technique for the proof, and given a 
supporting structure for this technique. Agreement does have one advantage 
over secrecy, as far as simplicity of proo~ since it only requires the existence 
of a solution, and an exhaustive search is not required Therefore we do not 
have to delve into the structure and content of every message in the system, 
only those which we believe are of interest. 
Our agreement technique is as follows. There are two general classes into 
which an agreement property can fall: either one host knows the given token 
initially, and the other then learns it through the course of the protocol, or 
neither host knows it, and both must learn it. The first of these two cases 
is the simpler. In this case the analytical effort is undertaken by only one 
host, as the initial knowledge predicates will trivially satisfy the other host. 
Our translator now generates two sub-lemmas, one for each host. Only one 
of these is of interest to us, that for the host who must learn the token. The 
majority of the effort of the proof is in this sub-lemma, which was discussed 
in detail in Section 3.6. Once this sub-lemma is proven, the main theorem is 
simply broken into two cases, one for each host. The case for the host who 
learned it by initial knowledge is trivially proven, and the case for the other 
host is proven via instantiating the above sub-lemma. It should be noted 
that although we generate two sub-lemmas, only one will be used. 
The other agreement scenario, in which neither host knows the given 
token in initial knowledge, is slightly more complex. Here we again take 
one of the sub-lemmas generated, except now the choice of sub-lemma is 
more difficult. The operator must inspect the protocol and determine which 
of the two extensions generated by the heuristic is valid for both hosts to 
learn. If neither are valid, one must be constructed by hand; although this 
construction is simple to do by modifying one of those auto-generated. Once 
the correct extension has been constructed, it is instantiated into one of the 
agreement lemmas, which is then proved in a similar manner to the case 
discussed above. Once this lemma is completed it can then be instantiated 
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into the final theorem, thus solving half of the agreement. We now have the 
given extension in place, and only one host remaining, thus a similar proof as 
for the sub-lemma is carried out. Although this does not break as cleanly into 
subsections as the other case, it is still easy to use within the environment. 
The proving of the sub-lemmas is quite similar to that for secrecy, except 
in reverse. We are now trying to find a message in which a given host can 
learn a token. This is almost always within an encrypted message for any 
reasonable protocol, as agreement tokens are generally secure. There are 
generally multiple messages of interest for a given host and given token. For 
example, the token may be sent in one message, but only in its encrypted 
form, and the key for that may be negotiated via a public/private key hand-
shake. In this case there would be three messages of interest, each with 
varying levels of encryption. We would then walk through the expansion of 
knows, and use these messages to show how the token is learnt. 
5.1.3 Strategies 
The strategies we have developed are straightforward; we have not used many 
of the PVS's advanced techniques. However, they have been quite successful 
at simplifying the act of proving those lemmas for which they have been 
written. The main drawback when developing these strategies is the difficulty 
in keeping them generic. It is very easy to put in protocol specific constants. 
For example, in the encryption depth strategy, depending on the depth of 
the given protocol, a certain equation would be placed on a different line. 
Our original strategy would then fail here, rewriting the wrong line. These 
problems are easily removed once they have been identified, but are often 
difficult to determine initially. 
5.1.4 General Comments 
At the moment there is a single strategy definition for all protocols, as we 
have not yet found a need for protocol dependent strategies. However, it 
would be a trivial task to alter this to use a generalised file, as well as a 
protocol dependent file, which could also be created from the translation 
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tool, or coded by hand if that were desirable. The use of parameterised 
strategies has allowed us to retain generalisation so far. 
Our initial goal, as we discussed in Chapter 1, was to develop a system 
for automating the encoding and proof of security properties. We believe 
that we have succeeded in these goals, our encoding step being completely 
automated, and though the proof stage remains partially manual, we believe 
that this is a result of the undecidability of several portions of the proof, 
and a completely automated system would be impossible for all classes of 
protocol, due to the necessarily unbounded nature of our model. Our case 
study analysis has demonstrated that the effort involved in these proofs can 
be drastically reduced through the use of our system. 
5.2 Future Work 
5.2.1 Analyse Additional Protocols 
While we have attempted to remain general in our encoding, primarily by 
investigating both NetBill and SET simultaneously, we realise that our en-
coding may be biased towards certain types of protocol design. We would 
thus like to describe and verify various other protocols to ensure that our 
system behaves well under a variety of conditions. During the course of the 
analysis the protocol Millicent [Man95] was proposed as an alternative proto-
col to examine, rather than NetBill. However its integration with the HTTP 
[BLFF96] protocol makes it difficult to extract the core protocol information. 
We would also be interested in protocols which involve internal calculations, 
see Section 5.2.3. 
5.2.2 General Spy Properties 
In our input language definition, we have added the ability to describe cer-
tain properties of the Spy. However, only message interception has been 
implemented. The other two properties described, message destruction and 
message creation, allow for a much greater range of protocol analysis, as they 
force protocols to be tamper proof, and force hosts to be more involved in the 
verification of alternate hosts. Since the current design separates Spy prop-
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erties from protocol description, it would not be difficult to have a library of 
PVS definitions for various logics, which could be enabled and disabled via 
the translation tool. 
5.2.3 Computational Rules 
Computational rules are again implemented in the input language, although 
not fully carried through to the protocol encoding. We allow each message 
to define any number of calculations to be performed, as well as any number 
of logical checks on any of the variables involved in a protocol. Thus for 
protocols such as IKE [HC98], where the shared key is calculated by each host 
during the course of the communication, we can encode this information, and 
allow for a more in-depth analysis. This is particularly important when secure 
information can be broken without complete knowledge of the keys involved, 
but through some known mathematical analysis of a subset of the required 
data. The current implementation of the tool provides the infrastructure for 
this analysis, but none of the higher level code. 
5.2.4 Anonymous Hosts 
In the Needham-Schroeder [NS78] protocol the initial message is commu-
nicated from an anonymous host, such that the receiver cannot infer any 
information about the sender. We can currently emulate a similar behaviour 
by adding an additional host from whom these anonymous messages can be 
sent, but this could cause problems with unexpected side effects, i.e.: if there 
are two anonymous messages, are they from the same host? It would be more 
elegant if this were handled in an automated manner to remove the chance 
of an input error by the user. 
5.2.5 Trace Run Identifiers 
In the current encoding, each variable is associated with a host, to allow 
variables to change values between runs. This feature does, however, cause 
some semantic issues when trying to determine the value of a variable, as it 
may not be associated with the correct host. An alternative to this encoding 
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would be to attach a unique session number to each new protocol initiali-
sation, and then bind the variables using this session number. This would 
add a small amount of complexity to the encoding, but would not interfere 
too severely. The changes would be mostly superficial, so conceptually most 
of the encoding would remain the same. However from an implementation 
and strategy point of view, this would require changes to most sections of 
the code. This requirement for large changes made this extension infeasi-
ble initially, especially due to its dubious benefits, as it only really affects 
readability and ease of understanding, rather than the core abilities of the 
encoding. 
5. 2. 6 Initial Know ledge Encoding 
As we have divided our encoding into protocol dependent and protocol inde-
pendent subsystems, when dealing with the knows predicate it is important 
to instantiate the initial knowledge axioms as appropriate. This has the slight 
drawback that the operator must remember to do this. If this is forgotten, it 
does not cause any theorems to be proved which would otherwise not be, but 
it does mean that some theorems remain unproven, where initial knowledge 
could be used. An alternative encoding would be to insert initial knowl-
edge into the knows predicate. However this would needlessly duplicate the 
facts, as knows is used quite frequently. This would also cause problems with 
finding the correct round bindings, since if we have a multi-round run of a 
protocol, we cannot be sure which round of hosts we are interested in at the 
time we must instantiate knows. This would also complicate the encoding, as 
we could no longer distinguish the independent sections as easily. We have 
not currently found a suitable compromise between these two extremes. 
5.2. 7 Fuller Analysis of Non-standard Protocols 
All of our current analysis has been towards protocols which fit a certain 
model, such as not having self-referential processes. We would like to also 
analyse protocols which contain slight differences from this norm to ensure 
that our lemma and strategy system is capable of scaling to these systems. 
We do not anticipate these having any impact on our encoding model, since it 
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is already a very general system, but our strategies, in particular, often expect 
a certain flow from the system. We expect a steady progression through the 
system, with recursion being handled by our encoding, rather than by the 
protocol. Here we are more interested in stress testing our encoding system. 
Both of our case studies were quite standard security protocols, and while 
this does provide weH- rounded results, it also limits the extreme scenarios 
which we have analysed. 
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